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ABSTRACT 
 
In the Central Valleys of Puebla Mexico a rural microfinance scheme called “savings 
box” (caja de ahorros) has been established to promote sustainable development among 
rural small-holders. After ten years of operation of this microfinance community scheme 
there is little information on the differing performance of groups and factors that 
influence their survival in rural communities. The study was designed to elucidate how 
rural microfinance is related to social, human, cultural and financial capitals as indicators 
of survival and sustainability of the savings and loan groups. A cross-sectional study 
among 34 informal microfinance groups was conducted through interviews with 
representatives and members of these groups. Multiple ordered logistic regression was 
used as a statistical technique to find causal relationships between the dependent variable 
expressed as the success level of the saving box and the independent variables of social, 
human, cultural and financial capital. Social capital, measured in terms of relations of 
trust, reciprocity, rules and norms, and cultural capital measured as the participation of 
women in leadership roles in the group, were the most important factors affecting the 
savings box survival and performance status. On the other hand, human capital, measured 
as the average schooling of treasurers, along with financial capital measured as the 
diversity of income sources and collective ownership of physical assets of the groups did 
not show statistically significant effects on success or survival of the savings box groups. 
Public policies and institutional support addressed to improve informal microfinance 
services through training, technical advice, and funding is necessary, as well as a suitable 
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legal framework that allows the practice and research for learning and improving this 
kind of social institution. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Improving living standards of rural small-holders in developing countries has 
often been addressed through rural or community development projects. Several 
approaches have been followed to incorporate small farmers in the development process 
and alleviate rural poverty. One approach has been to encourage technology transfer 
through the diffusion of innovations approach resulting in farm output increase, which 
would be translated into income improvement. Other approaches have focused more on 
local organization by involving more comprehensive strategies in directing social, 
economic and technological development efforts. Building social capital and 
microfinance schemes by extension programs has become a common practice by 
governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) to improve farm 
production and household livelihoods (Ochieng, 2002). In the Central Valleys of Puebla 
State, Mexico, rural community microfinance schemes called “savings boxes” have been 
established to promote sustainable development among rural small-holders. These 
“saving boxes” have been in operation for about ten years, but the impact of this 
microfinance model has not been studied. Extensive knowledge about local conditions 
and key factor interactions in such contexts, whatever the development project approach, 
represents a determinant for its success or failure. Linkages between sustainable small-
farmers organizations and key socio-economic factors, such as social capital, cultural 
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capital, human capital, political capital, financial capital, natural capital, and 
microfinance schemes provide insight on how to promote sustainable rural development 
among small-holders and their organizations in developing countries. 
 
1.2 Microfinance Resources in Mexico 
 
 Microfinance resources available for the rural population in Mexico can be 
classified in three types: formal institutions such as banks, credit unions, and savings and 
credit cooperatives; semi-formal sources like NGOs; informal sources such as local 
moneylenders, family members and friends; informal saving and loan groups such as 
“cajas de ahorro”* or savings boxes; and informal saving groups such as rotating savings 
and credit associations (ROSCAS), which in Mexico are named in different ways, 
according to the region such as “tandas”, “rifas”, “pitarrillas”, “cundinas”, etc. 
 The formal banking system typically has not being interested in rural poor 
clientele, which results in poor or negligible coverage of financial services from these 
institutions. In addition, formal banking institutions are focused on urban areas and big 
enterprises, including big agricultural corporations (AMUCSS, 2007; Sharma, 2004; 
Adams, 2002; Zeller & Sharma, 2000; Shreiner & Nagarajan, 1998). Small farmers 
traditionally were served by the governmental development banking system 
(BANRURAL) until this entity was dismantled in the era of structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) promoted by the Washington Consensus (Zezza and Llambi, 2002;  
 
*Caja de ahorro is generally translated as a savings bank or credit union. However, since 
these groups are much more informally organized, the term “savings box” was closer. A 
caja may be a generic box, a safe, or a cash-box. 
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Weber, 2002). At that time, for financial purposes, farmers were classified 
 in three categories and a corresponding financial scheme. Farm enterprises would be 
served by commercial banks through funds from the second-tier governmental 
development program of the Mexican Central Bank called FIRA (Instituted Funds 
Related to Agriculture). The second segment of farmers was those in a transitional status 
from traditional to modern farming but with substantial resources (land, water, 
technology). This intermediate group was supported by the new “Financiera del Campo” 
(which replaced the BANRURAL banking system), and programs from the Ministry of 
Agriculture like “Alianza para el Campo” and FIRCO (Funds for Shared Risk). The third 
segment was composed by marginal and small farmers in rain fed areas called 
subsistence farmers or self-consumption farmers. This category of poor farmers would be 
supported through assistance programs addressed to fight poverty. These programs are 
mainly from the Ministry of Social Development, some of them are credit based on the 
farmers pledge to repay, support to coffee producers, farm workers, and “PROGRESA” 
(program of education, health and nutrition) later called “OPORTUNIDADES” 
(opportunities). Under these conditions of liberalization and deregulation of public 
financial services to the poor and especially to small farmers, survival strategies have 
emerged in rural areas to cope with financial needs. Some of these strategies build on 
basic community social relationships such as informal groups among family members 
and relatives, neighbors and friends. The saving box community scheme, in this context 
represents an innovative and effective means to provide microfinance services for 
meeting farmer necessities. 
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1.3 Problem Statement and Research Objectives 
 
Scientific and technological advancements in agriculture were especially 
remarkable after World War II. The Green Revolution is one example and its 
implementation was mainly addressed to “feeding the world”, especially those countries 
struggling with hunger and famine due to agricultural under-production (Hecht, 1995). 
The Green Revolution precepts were put into practice in Mexico; the advantages mainly 
favored market-oriented farmers with irrigation systems and enough land (Henriquez and 
Patel, 2004; Gliessman, 1990; Ochieng, 2002). The Green Revolution technology was 
based on improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and machinery, along with other supports 
such as credit, insurance, technical assistance, infrastructure and marketing assistance 
that were provided by governmental agencies. However, during the 1960’s, most of the 
production of corn and beans for the domestic market occurred under rain-fed conditions 
and by small farmers for whom the benefits from the Green Revolution were not 
available (CIMMYT, 1974). 
In central Mexico in 1967, an initiative was formulated between the International 
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) and Colegio de Postgraduados (the 
Graduate School of the former National School of Agriculture, now Universidad 
Autonoma Chapingo), in order to support small farmers in areas with proper 
agroecological conditions for making them more efficient in crop production and income 
generation. This effort, named ‘Proyecto Puebla’ and later re-named ‘Plan Puebla,’ had 
two main objectives: (1) to develop, test, and refine a strategy to rapidly increase the 
maize yields of small farmers, and (2) train technical staff from other areas in the 
components and the effective implementation of that strategy in other regions (Turrent, 
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1987). This strategy was developed from coordinated actions among technicians, 
institutions and farmers. Some of the most important elements of that strategy included 
field research on farmers’ land and on-site technical recommendations by experts 
followed by the spreading of this knowledge among small farmers by an extension team. 
The extension program communicated field research results and recommendations 
for specific agrosystems. Extension staff promoted those inputs and services required to 
apply the new technology, such as improved seed, chemical fertilizer, pesticides, 
financial credit, insurance for covering the investment and other services like crop 
commercialization and farmer support organizations. Redclift (1983) stated that ‘Plan 
Puebla’, by that time was an innovative research-training-extension model, which 
contributed to the ‘appropriate technology’ thinking among researchers and agricultural 
development institutions. At the beginning, the extension team was focused on maize 
recommendations and the extension program was expanding as field researchers 
incorporated other crops, vegetables, fruits, livestock, biotechnology, and natural 
resource conservation. In these research programs other researchers studied socio-
economic aspects like gender, rural family, local and global markets, and rural 
microfinance. The complexity and amount of information disseminated through research 
and extension increased with time. 
However, access to financial resources has always represented a serious constraint 
for small farmers, not just for farm input acquisitions but also for coping with household 
needs. Too often, traditional banking systems in developing countries have considered 
the poor, including small farmers, as non-clientele. Lack of capital assets for collateral for 
supporting loans, along with their low repayment capacity, and the risky nature of 
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farming, were factors used to deny loans or to discourage participation of the rural poor 
in bank-financed schemes. As a result, a wide variety of alternative means for self-
finance among small farmers in rural communities has been developed, ranging from 
farmers’ cooperatives to family and neighbors’ saving and loan clubs (Yunus, 1999). 
In small rural villages in Puebla State of Central Mexico, a saving and loan 
community scheme called “caja de ahorro” or “saving box” is used by small farmers to 
access financial services, mainly providing savings accounts and granting loans to their 
members. These groups are self-managed and self-controlled. Initially seed capital and 
technical advice were given to 34 small farmers’ groups by Colegio de Postgraduados 
scientists. After almost 10 years of the savings box microfinance scheme, some groups 
have survived, are self sufficient and working effectively. Some groups are working at 
“half-capacity”, which means that the group exists and has its resources (invested in 
loans) gathering interest and issuing small loans with the interest income; however, 
members are no longer contributing savings to the scheme. Other groups no longer exist. 
Members are working by themselves but not as a group and the saving box has been 
liquidated.  
There are many questions about factors related to group or organizational survival 
in rural communities. As stated by Pretty and Ward (2001): 
“The fact that groups have been established does not, however, guarantee that 
resources will continue to be managed sustainably or equitably. What happens over 
time? How do these groups change, and which will survive or terminate? Some will 
become highly effective, growing and diversifying their activities, whilst others will 
struggle on in name only. Can we say anything about the conditions that are likely 
to promote resilience and persistence? There is surprisingly little empirical evidence 
about the differing performances of groups” (Pretty and Ward, 2001:217). 
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The comments of Pretty and Ward (2001) are also applicable to the saving box 
microfinance scheme used in Puebla State. After 10 years of implementation, there is 
little information on the differing performance of groups and factors that influence their 
survival in rural communities. 
Thus, the initial research question of this study is: Which factors are related to the 
success or failure of community rural microfinance schemes called saving boxes? And 
more specifically: How is rural microfinance related to human, social, cultural, 
financial/built, political and natural capitals, when used as indicators of survival and 
sustainability of the savings and loan groups? Analysis of the role and impact of saving 
boxes will enable researchers and practitioners to determine how rural microfinance 
systems are working “on the ground” to generate sustainable rural development. 
Furthermore, identifying significant contributing factors to rural sustainability will help 
in the effort to refine and improve rural development strategies to achieve sustainable 
rural communities. 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
 
Microfinance practices have become an important means to fight against poverty 
especially in developing countries. In urban settings in Mexico, microfinance has evolved 
under credit and loan cooperatives (AMUCCS, 2007); however, in rural areas informal 
microfinance schemes still represent the major source for savings and loan services. 
Informal microfinance schemes in Mexican rural communities can vary from local 
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money lenders, relatives and friends loans, to informal groups such as ROSCAS and 
savings boxes. 
Rural microfinance schemes not only represent a major source for savings and 
credit services for the poor due to the scarce coverage from the formal banking system. 
Rural microfinance schemes also represent an alternative to the formal money market. In 
this sense, rural microfinance as alternative paradigm to the current banking system, is 
addressed to ensure the existence and development of small, sustainable rural 
communities, which are important because they can provide healthy food, fodder, fuel, 
and fiber, environmental services, equitable social relationships, and vital local 
economies (Lyson, 2004; Francis et al., 2003; Costanza, 2007; Swinton et al., 2006). 
Understanding how informal microfinance is working in rural communities and 
knowing which socioeconomic factors are related to the success of microfinance 
community schemes can help scholars, practitioners, and policy makers in the design, 
implementation, and assessment of sustainable community development projects. 
 
1.5 Organization of the Study 
 
 The study is organized in five chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction. Chapter 2 is 
the review of the literature, which is comprised of three sections: 1) conceptual and 
theoretical perspectives on microfinance, 2) the saving box scheme, and 3) factors related 
to success of microfinance schemes. Chapter 3 describes the research methodology used 
in this study. This chapter includes the research design, questionnaire design, secondary 
research, the research setting, operationalization and measurement of variables, the data 
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analysis process, and reliability and validity issues related to the study. Chapter 4 is the 
presentation and discussion of results of the study. This part is composed by the test of 
hypotheses through statistical analysis and supportive field information from qualitative 
data. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of the study, some policy implications related to 
the major findings and recommendations for future research based on the conclusions. 
The references used in the study are listed in the Literature Cited and finally two 
appendixes are attached. The first one includes information from secondary sources and 
from opinions of the interviewee. The second is the instrument used for the field data 
collection. 
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CHAPTER 2.  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Conceptual framework 
 
The focus of this study is the sustainability of small-farmers’ organizations in 
rural communities. In the proposed study, community capitals and microfinance schemes 
are perceived as key factors in sustainability in rural communities. By focusing on factors 
that support local capitals and microfinance schemes of small-farmer organizations rural 
communities can approach sustainability more closely than can the current agricultural 
paradigm under the market convention in which industrialized agriculture is based on 
mega farm operations (Thevenot, 2001). 
This research study will utilize the Sustainable Rural Livelihoods framework 
(Scoones, 1998; Chambers and Conway, 1991) in a “capitals building” approach 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Flora and Flora, 2004) to assess the contribution of different capitals to 
the success or failure of a rural community microfinance scheme called “savings boxes”. 
Success is defined in terms of supporting sustainable development, in this case, in rural 
communities in the State of Puebla in central Mexico. These approaches, articulated 
below, will be useful for diagnosis and action, in which main actors are the community’s 
own members or stakeholders. 
The sustainable rural livelihoods (SRL) framework is one way to approach 
complex issues related to rural poverty. This framework focuses on different households 
in a vulnerability context based on degree of accessibility to livelihood assets which are 
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affected by the assets’ diversity, amount, and balance among them. Those assets are also 
called capitals (human, social, physical, natural, and financial). Not only is the amount of 
these capitals important, but also their diversity and balance among them. Poor 
households face a high index of vulnerability due to shocks (floods, droughts, cyclones, 
deaths in the family, violence or civil unrest), seasonality (crop production, job market), 
and socioeconomic dynamics (population, environmental change, technology, markets 
and trade, and globalization). Policies, institutions, and processes from outside the 
community also influence livelihood strategies and livelihood outcomes. Fragile or 
unbalanced livelihood assets may prevent small communities from coping with shocks, 
changes or trends, or force communities to adopt unsustainable livelihood strategies for 
survival (Chambers and Conway, 1991; DFID, 1999). 
 
DFID, 1999 
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Flora and Flora (2008) stated that every rural community has its own resources 
and when those resources or assets are invested to produce other resources, then they 
become capital. These authors suggested that seven kinds of capitals should be 
considered within rural communities: cultural, human, social, financial, built, political 
and natural. These capitals should be in equilibrium to prevent disruptions in the 
economy, environment or social equity. 
 
 
Figure 2. Community capitals and interactions 
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The “savings box” as a rural microfinance scheme 
In the case of small groups of peasants living in rural villages, microfinance 
schemes have been developed to respond to their limited access to formal financial 
services such as banks and credit unions. This alternative savings and credit model has 
been called “saving boxes.” Saving boxes are managed directly by peasants who are 
organized in small groups, which can vary from 10 to 40 members; the most common 
size of a typical group is 15 members (Colegio de Postgraduados, 2003). 
Since the management responsibility of the saving box is held by the members 
collectively they are in charge of the administrative tasks of managing money and 
keeping records, calculating interests and other activities that require administrative 
skills. However, the formal educational level of the adult in these communities averages 
5 years of elementary school (Colegio de Postgraduados, 2003). The lack of formal 
education becomes a real challenge for members as they seek to improve their individual 
and group capabilities. Savings box groups increase members’ access to monetary 
resources to resolve issues of food production, health care, education, housing 
improvement, initiating and expanding small businesses, and even repayment of other 
debts. In examining this process of building and developing savings and loan schemes, 
one may identify at least the following capitals: cultural, human, social, political, 
financial, built, and natural. However, what is not clearly understood is how these 
capitals intervene and interact with the success or failure of rural community 
microfinance schemes called saving boxes. 
The Colegio de Postgraduados served as an external consultant in a project called 
“sustainable integrated rural development in the central valleys of Puebla and Oaxaca 
  
14
 
states”. Throughout its involvement, the university recorded the process of building and 
developing community savings and loan schemes as it provided technical advice, 
training, and participated in various events such as meetings, assemblies, self-diagnosis, 
programming, and evaluation workshops. These notes along with each saving box’s 
records, data from key informant interviews, and direct observation provide a rich body 
of data for analyzing and identifying relationships between indicators that influence 
success or limitations of these rural community savings and loan schemes. 
 
2.2 Microfinance and the saving box scheme: Theoretical 
framework 
 
This section focuses on different approaches to analyzing microfinance schemes. 
The evolution of financial services addressed to the poor, especially to the rural poor, are 
presented and discussed. The progression of informal lending to microcredit and 
microfinance schemes, and differences and similarities among different approaches of 
savings and loans are contrasted with the saving box schemes.. 
2.2.1 Microcredit vs. microfinance 
 
Microfinance is understood as a developmental approach that emphasizes 
providing financial and social intermediation. The financial intermediation includes 
services such as savings, credit, and insurance. The social intermediation is represented 
by the organization of groups to voice individual aspirations, to raise concerns for policy 
makers and to help develop self-confidence and bargaining power. These services are 
provided by three different kinds of lenders: formal institutions like banks, credit unions 
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and co-operatives; semi-formal institutions like NGOs; and informal sources like local 
moneylenders and shopkeepers. Both microfinance institutions (MFIs) may be either 
formal or semi-formal.  
Microcredit and microfinance have both functional and conceptual differences 
(Khandakar and Rahman, 2006). The main functional difference between microfinance 
and microcredit programs is the kind of service they provide. Microcredit is almost 
uniquely focused on loan distribution and recovery and is invariably related to group 
formation and compulsory savings, as is the case of the Grameen Bank model (Woolcock 
and Narayan, 2000), whereas microfinance programs provide all kinds of financial 
services including microcredit. According to Khandakar and Rahman (2006) the 
microfinance movement is called the second revolution in credit theory and policy, while 
the first revolution was considered microcredit. Microcredit is more concerned on how to 
overcome the structural obstacles like the lack of information, lack of collateral, high 
cost, high risk, and systematic market bias, which can negatively influence savings and 
credit services to the poor. Khandakar and Rahman stated that the key methods used in 
microcredit programs are a standardized and limited set of products and services 
(especially credit and compulsory savings), group lending, social collateral or joint 
liability, forced savings, small initial loan size, loan amount tied to savings, standardized 
loan repayment and disbursal schedules, and frequent repayments. The evolution and 
innovations in these methods were driven by NGOs and donor demands called product 
centered services. In contrast, microfinance is focused on the demand side or is customer-
centered (Khandakar and Rahman, 2006). 
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There are two main conceptual differences between microcredit and microfinance. 
The first difference concerns profits. NGOs and non-profit institutions operating 
microcredit schemes do not aim for profit, while microfinance is a for-profit, private 
venture. The second conceptual difference is the origin of resources for funding their 
operations. Microcredit programs depend on external finance from donors but 
microfinance programs generally manage their own resources through savings 
mobilization (Khandakar and Rahman, 2006). 
2.2.2 Informal lending schemes 
 
The saving box scheme is a microfinance scheme. It occurs in the context of 
informal lending sources predominantly in rural areas such as self-help groups, solidarity 
groups or joint liability groups, rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) and 
accumulative savings and credit associations (ASCRAs) (Zeller and Sharma, 2000; Tsai, 
2004; Shreiner, 2001; among others). Informal lending sources are comprised of friends, 
relatives, neighbors, informal groups, and moneylenders. Tsai (2004) argued that 
informal financing mechanisms are imperfect substitutes for the formal banking sector. 
He called these alternatives ‘non institutional credit agencies’, which include agricultural 
moneylenders, professional moneylenders, traders, relatives, friends, and others. To 
illustrate this, he pointed out that farmers in China obtain four times more credit from the 
informal market than from the formal financial institutions. In India in 1992, 40% of rural 
households continued to rely on informal financing (Tsai, 2004). Shreiner (2001) 
described six basic virtues of informal finance based on the experience of informal 
financing efforts from rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), money-guards, 
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hire-purchase stores, moneylenders, pawnshops, trade finance and check cashing outlets 
to lending among family and friends. These virtues are: (1) slashed transaction costs; (2) 
increased supply of credit, savings, and insurance; (3) services to women; (4) credit upon 
one’s word instead of physical collateral; (5) socially enforced and/or self-enforced 
contracts; and (6) being amenable to repeated transactions. However, some perceived 
weaknesses of informal finance are no deposit insurance, no large loans, no long-term 
loans, and no means to legally enforce contracts (Shreiner, 2001). 
Bhatt and Tang (2001) stated that group-based microfinance is used as a “linkage” 
between the individual and financial services that seeks to increase the flexibility and 
reduce the disadvantages of the informal credit market. If appropriately designed, group-
based lending has the potential for enhancing economic development for rural 
communities. 
Group-based microfinance has been utilized as the core of operations of many 
microcredit programs, for the Grameen Bank and its replicates in the developing world. 
An example was presented by Sharma (2004) from two case studies in Nepal and India, 
in which both based their microfinance practices on groups. The author found that these 
groups were self-regulated through peer-selection, peer monitoring, and peer enforcement 
of contracts in order to have access to microfinance services. 
2.2.3 Self-help groups and bank linking 
 
Tsai (2004) found that in India microfinance services led by NGOs have followed 
one of three forms: self-help groups (SHGs), cooperatives, or Grameen replicators. The 
author pointed that, as of 2002, there were one million SHGs with 17 million members. 
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By March 2003, over 444 banks had participated in microfinance linkages with 717,360 
SHGs. In total the SHG-Bank linkage program had served an estimated 7.8 million low-
income households. Over 500 NGOs were serving as financial intermediaries by 
brokering funds between banks and low-income borrowers (Tsai, 2004). In the same 
fashion, Reddy and Manak (2005) stated that there were two million SHGs in India; 1.6 
million SHGs have been bank-linked with correlative loans of 69 billion Rupees. In 
2004-05 alone, almost 800,000 SHGs were bank-linked (Reddy and Manak, 2005). 
The SHG model is based on groups of about 10 to 20 people, generally women 
from a similar class and region who came together to form savings and credit 
organizations. The members pool financial resources to make small interest bearing loans 
among themselves. Through this process an ethic focused on savings is developed. Terms 
and conditions of loans are set in the group by designated members (Reddy and Manak, 
2005). 
One important attempt to deal with the informal nature of SHGs is the creation of 
SHG federations, which according to the legal system in countries like India are 
considered formal institutions registered as societies, mutual benefit trusts and mutually 
aided cooperative societies. SHG federations generate important benefits such as stronger 
political and advocacy capabilities for women; sharing of knowledge and experience; 
economies of scale; and access to greater capital (Reddy and Manak, 2005). 
On the other hand, Morduch and Rutherford (2003) stated that the outlook for the 
SHGs movement is far from certain. Even advocates of this approach recognize that there 
is much to be done to upgrade and mainstream SHGs, mainly because the present system 
appears unsustainable. It is not clear who is responsible for maintaining quality in terms 
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of service and how the costs of doing so are to be met. The authors concluded that neither 
NGOs nor banks are ideal candidates for those tasks. Therefore, leaving the groups alone 
in their bookkeeping management of their internal savings and loan accounts, without 
outside assistance, will increase the difficulty of ensuring quality especially for the rural 
poor. They suggested that if the SHG movement represents a real financial alternative for 
the poor, this program should undergo a transition into a more stable institutional form, 
such as the credit union system. In this fashion SHGs are regarded as an ‘interim’ means 
to provide microfinance services in a period before other institutions can be developed or 
adapted (Morduch and Rutherford, 2003). 
 Nair (2005) discussed some constraints in India that stand in the way of SHG-
based microfinance programs making significant achievements. The financial 
sustainability of SHGs was not clear because several of their costs were subsidized by 
promoter agencies which operated at less than market costs paid by SHGs on loans from 
banks. Their organizational sustainability may be linked to their small size, which limits 
their financial and human capital (Nair, 2005). Nair (2005) assumed the SHGs need to be 
sustainable and suggested that SHG federations have the potential to contribute to SHGs’ 
sustainability. SHG federations support SHGs through various services to achieve 
economies of scale; obtain value-added services, reduce transaction costs and enhance 
empowerment thereby contributing to organizational sustainability of the SHGs (Nair, 
2005) 
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2.2.4 ROSCAS and ASCRAS 
 
 
Shreiner and Nagarajan (1998) predicted creditworthiness using visually 
observable characteristics when they studied accumulating savings and credit 
associations (ASCRAs) and rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) in 
Gambia. Gambian ASCRAs and ROSCAs are similar in that they are both informal, 
cooperative community organizations that collect deposits and make loans. They differ in 
that the amount lent by ASCRAs need not equal the amount collected at a given meeting, 
whereas all the deposits mobilized by a ROSCA are immediately lent out. In addition, not 
every member of the ASCRA borrows money, and the timing of ASCRA loans depends 
on borrower demands, whereas all members of a ROSCA must borrow money and the 
timing of ROSCA loan is generally fixed (Shreiner and Nagarajan, 1998). 
These authors studied the “Kafo” that is an informal community cooperative 
organization, which meets the definition of an ASCRA according to Bouman (1995). 
ASCRAs have about 100 members who provide each other with basic social, financial, 
and insurance services. Most groups maintain a common fund built up by occasionally 
collecting dues and/or by selling produce from a plot collectively farmed by members of 
the group. The ASCRA draws on the common fund to make grants to members with 
emergencies or to make loans. Many groups also collect small deposits from their 
members at regular intervals and periodically return the accumulated sum to the 
members, often immediately before the celebration of Ramadam. 
The “osusu” is a cooperative community organization fitting Ardener’s (1964) 
and Bouman’s (1979, 1977) definitions of a ROSCA. These ROSCAs are groups of 10 to 
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30 members who regularly meet to contribute a fixed amount of cash to a common fund 
which is immediately distributed by some rule of rotation to a single member. More 
meetings follow until each member has received the pot once. Thus, ROSCAs collect 
deposits and immediately lend them out again. All pots except the first and the last have a 
loan component (the amount yet to be contributed by the recipient in future meetings) and 
a savings-withdrawal component (the amount already contributed by the recipient in 
previous meetings). 
Seibel (2000) described the case of informal finance in Liberia. The institution of 
rotating savings (ROSCA) is ancient, dating back at least to the 16th century, when 
Yoruba slaves carried the concept to the Caribbean as part of their institutional luggage-
or social capital. Both the term “esusu” and the practice have persisted to this day, as 
“esusu” in the Bahamas, “susu” in Tobago or “sou” in Trinidad. Among the Yoruba in 
Nigeria today, there is hardly a single adult who is not a member in one or even several 
esusus, which range in size from several dozen to hundreds of members. The institution 
exists all over West Africa as well as in many other parts of the world as an integral part 
of the local microeconomy and referred to with its own vernacular terms (arisan in 
Indonesia, paluwagan in the Philippines, gameya in Egypt, ekubin in Ethiopia, and 
cuchubal in Guatemala (Seibel, 2000). 
Aniket (2005) studied modified ROSCAs in microfinance named “totine” in 
Cameroon and Senegal, “esusu” in Nigeria, “stokvel” in South Africa, “bishi” and “chit” 
fund in India (Bouman,1994). Besley et al. (1993) suggested that “ROSCA constitute one 
of a number of institutions, whose existence is pervasive in developing economies.” What 
has made it a pervasive as well as enduring is its simple and intuitive rules which make 
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very little demand on the intellectual capability of the participants; this levels the playing 
field for participants from all backgrounds and intellectual capabilities” (Besley et al., 
1993). 
Variations of principles for better management of ASCRAs have been used to 
improve finance alternatives such as Financial Service Associations, a program started by 
IFAD in the Republic of South Africa in 1994. These principles are proximity between 
service provider and clients, local financial intermediation, ownership and self-
management by the poor, self-reliance, and sustainability (Seibel, 2000). 
 
2.2.5 Saving box and the other microfinance community schemes: 
similarities and differences 
 
Saving box classification 
The saving box scheme in Mexico has several features showing many similarities 
and differences from existing microcredit and microfinance schemes. The saving box can 
be described as a savings club, which is in essence a SHG and an informal lender in the 
category of Informal Finance Group (IFG) like ROSCAs, ASCRAs or Grameen model 
solidarity groups. The saving box scheme can also be categorized as a micro finance 
institution (MFI), since its goal is to provide savings and loan services. 
The members in the saving box scheme are, at the same time, owners and 
customers. They are the main clientele for loan release and they share the benefits earned 
through gained interests. Therefore, the profit concept is hard to apply in these 
circumstances. They pay interest for using their own resources but they share the 
revenues gained. In this sense the saving box is more like a solidarity group in which 
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self-help, self-sufficiency, food security, and other goals are the main motivations. On the 
other hand, the saving box is different from the concept used by the Grameen model and 
replicators in which groups are mostly composed of women and a small number of 
members (5-6), where joint liability or social collateral is a key feature. In the saving box 
there is no joint liability rather it is self-selection, self-monitoring, and self-enforcement 
of the contracts that comprise the individual motivations to keep their savings safe. 
 
NGOs participation 
The concept of SHGs was first promoted by NGOs and later by governmental 
programs (Eyo, 2008; Reddy and Manak, 2005; Aniket, 2005; Tsai, 2004; Sharma, 2004; 
Morduch and Rutherford, 2003; Olomola, 2001; Seibel, 2000; Zeller and Sharma, 2000). 
The main goal of SHGs is linking groups with bank services, especially credit, and in 
some cases compulsory savings tied to credit (Seibel 2000, Nair 2005). For the saving 
box promotion and operation, no NGOs are involved. Individual savings and external 
donor seed capital constitute the bulk of resources for starting the lending program for 
each group. After five years of using seed capital, the starter fund was returned to the 
promoter agency in order to fund other groups. The interests gained by the seed capital 
remain in the group as a social fund. The concept of social fund is understood as an 
amount of money owned by the group, and generally built by individual shares and/or 
external donations. 
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Evolution of microfinance schemes 
In most of the cases saving box groups have evolved from small farmers groups 
organized around a productive project linked to crop production. They have followed 
some of the evolutionary trends from labor to credit described by Seibel (2000), which 
include from labor to cash; from non-financial to financial groups; from rotating to non-
rotating schemes; from short-lived to permanent groups; and from savings-only to 
savings-driven credit. 
The saving box scheme faces the same drawbacks as other informal microfinance 
alternatives. Despite their ability to economize on transaction costs and offer fast, 
flexible, and convenient financial services, informal credit markets suffer from many 
limitations such as lack of enforcement to repay, undercapitalization, and poor 
instruments for mobilizing savings, compared with formal financial markets (Bhatt and 
Tang, 2001). 
 
The concept of sustainability 
The main indicator for assessing sustainability of microfinance programs has been 
repayment of loans. Repayment rate and conditions are also critical for the saving box 
scheme (Wenner, 1995; Sharma and Zeller, 1997; Zeller, 1998, 1999; Wydick, 1999; 
Ghatak, 2002). In a case study about credit scoring in Colombia, Shreiner (2000) 
observed that the terms of the loan contract affected the risk of loans with monthly 
installments. The risk of loan non-payment increases by about 3 percentage points for 
each additional installment. A loan repaid monthly was about 0-6 percentage points 
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riskier than a loan repaid weekly. The Colombian lenders used these results in adjusting 
their loan contracts in search of an acceptable risk level. 
Ghatak (2002) reviewed repayment rates and the kind of liability assumed, using 
empirical studies comparing the performance of microfinance programs. The author 
concluded that microfinance programs using joint liability had better repayment rates 
than those using individual liability. Others have studied group lending programs that use 
joint liability and found that variables related to social cohesion and better information 
flow among group members had improved repayment rates (Wenner, 1995; Wydick, 
1997). 
Generally microfinance programs operating non-subsidized microcredit charge 
higher interest rates than those in the formal finance market (Tsai, 2004; Schreiner, 2001; 
Morduch and Rutherford, 2003; Zeller, 1999). This is true for the saving box scheme, in 
which the most common interest rate is about 3% monthly. However, microfinance 
programs offer lower interest rates than other informal lenders. Tsai (2004), in a study of 
NGO microfinance institutions, found that the highest monthly interest rate that rural 
borrowers in China would be willing to pay was 32.6%. The author also found that the 
interest rate in pawnbrokering in Chandrapur, India was 3% monthly (Tsai, 2004). 
Safe Save is a microfinance institution in Dhaka, Bangladesh, which offers 
savings and loan services addressed to the poor. Clients earn interests on the balances of 
their passbook accounts and they can make deposits or withdrawals at any time. Loans 
are collateralized by savings balances, and clients can borrow 1.5 times their savings. 
There is no fixed repayment schedule and loans are charged an interest of 3% monthly 
(Shreiner, 2001). 
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Morduch and Rutherford (2003) in their analysis of microfinance in India found 
that leading institutions charge between 24% and 48% per year. The Grameen Bank 
applied the lowest interest rate and most others were 36% (Morduch and Rutherford, 
2003). Zeller (1999) stated that village banks in Madagascar set savings rates between 
24% and 36% per year and lending rates at 36% to 48% per year, although the formal 
lending rate of the agricultural bank was only 14%. The lending rate from the village 
bank was higher than that from relatives and friends, but less than the lending rate of 60% 
interest from moneylenders (Zeller, 1999). 
 
Regulation 
Seibel (2000) questioned whether MFIs benefit more from banking status or by 
remaining hidden within an informal financial sector. He suggested that these 
microfinance institutions should stay informal if the policy environment is repressive 
enforcing interest rate regulation, submitting institutions to inappropriate supervisory 
agencies, or simply barring institutions from social practices. He argued that a delegated 
system for upgrading a large number of Informal Financial Institutions (IFIs) into formal 
microfinance institutions for regulation and supervision represented a big challenge 
because the large number of MFIs exceeded the capacity of most central banks or bank 
superintendencies in developing countries. Some countries like Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Tanzania and several Latin American countries planned to 
establish a second-tier regulatory authority as a self-regulatory and self-supervisory apex 
organization for MFIs. However, Seibel (2000) suggested that such an upgrading would 
have to be a voluntary step for the vast numbers of indigenous peoples IFIs. 
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Public policies 
In the 1980s, public policies and development banks began addressing the 
problem of providing cheap credit to the poor, which were regarded as risky and 
unbankable clientele by the formal finance sector. However, corrupt practices and high 
transaction costs in formal financial institutions resulted in failure to reach their 
institutional development goals (Bhatt and Tang, 2001). In a repressive policy 
environment, IFIs and other unregulated MFIs have a competitive advantage because 
they are free to set their own interest rates and other contract terms. Many IFIs remain 
informal simply because there is no suitable legal organization available, or at least no 
legal organization with sufficiently low minimum equity capital requirements or with 
capital adequacy ratios (Seibel, 2000). 
Technical assistance 
Ouattara et al. (1998) studied the role of technical assistance in microfinance 
programs in West Africa and found that direct, hands-on technical assistance was 
important, especially in the starting phase of the program, and that the promoting entity 
should provide comprehensive and fairly long-term assistance. When this technical 
assistance ends, a minimum support base should remain in order to lead the organization 
to an adequate level of sustainability (Ouattara et al., 1998). 
 
2.3 Factors related to success of microfinance schemes 
 
Some microfinance studies have addressed the role of socioeconomic variables among 
the poor, especially women and small farmers, to the success of microfinance programs 
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(Ghatak, 2002; Pitt, 2006). In the present study, an important feature was the assumption 
that for microfinance program success, a minimum threshold of socioeconomic assets 
must exist in order to support the establishment, development, and success of rural 
microfinance schemes. This idea was supported by Granovetter (1995) who argued that 
economic development took place through a mechanism that allowed individuals to 
initially draw on the benefits of close community membership but also enabled them to 
acquire the skills and resources to participate in networks that transcend their community, 
thereby progressively joining the economic mainstream. The Grameen Bank model also 
used pre-existing social capital in small villages to leverage its group-based credit 
programs that were started in Bangladesh (Morduch, 1998; Van Bastelaer, 2000). 
These kind of empirical studies regard microfinance programs as an independent 
variable, and therefore, a promoter of socioeconomic assets like human capital, social 
capital, and financial capital, among others. This promoter effect has been observed when 
microfinance programs come to rural communities as outside service providers, first 
under microcredit programs as Grameen Bank replications managed mainly by NGOs, 
and later, as microfinance services providers by public programs and private 
practitioners. However, when microfinance schemes emerge from the people in rural 
communities, such as saving boxes (SB), rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAS), and accumulative savings and credit associations (ASCRAS), they persist 
over time. Some of them evolve to semi-formal or formal microfinance institutions. Thus, 
it is important to identify underlying factors that influence such community self-help 
groups in their quest for social and economic sustainability. 
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As was stated by Nair (2005), the extent of sustainability and factors determining 
sustainability of SHGs are little studied. Knowledge on impact is also inadequate. The 
need to investigate these issues is long overdue. 
The following section of this literature review is presented to conceptualize and 
measure the variables involved in this study. Firstly, a conceptual definition is given 
according to scholars investigating each one of these variables. Secondly, possible ways 
to measure these variables are presented. And finally, a hypothesis for the study is 
proposed in which the independent variables are identified. 
Conceptualizing and measuring capitals have been addressed in different ways 
according to a researcher’s theoretical orientation. Economists usually favor econometric 
models based on statistical analysis from quantitative data. Social scientists, such as 
sociologists and anthropologists tend to support their analysis on qualitative data. 
However, the use of mixed methods (Creswell, 2003), which combine quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, have been increasingly used by social scientists in order to better 
understand and explain complex social issues.  
2.3.1 Social capital 
 
Social capital is defined as the relationships and communications between 
individuals within defined groups. According to Coleman (1988), social capital comes 
about through changes in the relations among persons that facilitate action. The function 
and value of social capital are determined and influenced by the individual components 
of social structure that can be used as resources for people to achieve their interests. 
Social institutions are proposed as economically productive resources in which the 
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concept of social capital is clearly implicit. The World Bank defines social capital as ‘the 
ability of individuals to increase their well-being through involvement in social networks’ 
(Bowles and Gintis, 2002).  
The importance and value of social capital can be demonstrated in a case study in 
a Midwestern community in the U.S.A. In this study Flora (1998), concluded that social 
capital was high in the community as evidenced by strong social networks, strong norms 
based on a dominant religion, intergenerational continuity of leadership, and a high level 
of trust that existed within the community. Integration and linkage of individual 
relationships can occur together and do contribute to economic and community 
development. Entrepreneurial social infrastructure and social capital are effective 
predictors of both collective and individual action (Flora, 1998). 
Flora et al. (1997) measured indicators to show a legitimacy of alternatives, 
resource mobilization, and social network qualities and found that communities with 
these characteristics were able to mobilize community economic development efforts and 
ultimately have measurably high entrepreneurial social infrastructure (Flora et al., 1997). 
On the other hand Fey et al. (2006), found that social networks were extremely 
important in most communities’ economic development efforts, within and outside of a 
given community. They decided that the number of new groups that formed and how 
communities leveraged outside help were sound ways to measure investments made in 
social capital (Fey et al., 2006). 
Wenner (1995) examined the determinants of performance of 25 Costa Rican 
credit groups and found that the use of “inside” information on character attributes, such 
as creditworthiness, in credit groups reduced the incidence of default by individuals. 
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Repayment performance was better in groups engaged in active screening of their 
members. The existence of a written code or group rules and informal screening of 
individuals significantly decreased loan delinquency. He also found that savings 
mobilization, which acted like an intra-group insurance, and more isolated communities 
were linked with better performance. 
Sharma and Zeller (1997) found that relatively remote communities and even 
communities that have higher than average rates of poverty, had better repayment rates 
than more urban or higher income communities in a sample of 128 groups interviewed in 
Bangladesh. A higher proportion of relatives within a group and higher loan amounts had 
negative impacts on group performance. According to these authors, the success of group 
lending cannot be solely attributed to innovations that reduce the costs of screening, 
monitoring and enforcing loan contracts, but also to the perceptions of long-lasting nature 
of the program by the intended borrowers in small rural communities. 
Zeller (1998) concluded that clear, internal rules of conduct, group size, 
communities characterized by a relatively high degree of monetarization, the presence of 
several agricultural input retailers and a lower exposure to covariate risks significantly 
improved repayment performance. The latter two characteristics were more likely to 
prevail in less remote villages. These conclusions were in contrast to the findings of 
Wenner (1995) and Sharma and Zeller (1997) who found improved loan repayment 
performance in more isolated and remote communities. 
Wydick (1999) analyzed the effects of social ties, peer monitoring and group 
pressure on the provision of intra-group insurance, the mitigation of morosely and overall 
group repayment performance in 137 Guatemalan borrowing groups in Quetzaltenango 
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and Totonicapan. He argued that the success of group lending appeared to be driven by 
peer monitoring and intra-group insurance through solidarity. Social sanctions play a 
secondary and supporting role. Wydick concluded that in order to reduce problems 
related to asymmetric information in credit markets, group lending may be less effective 
in areas where social ties were strong. Paxton et al. (2000) studied 140 Burkinabe credit 
groups. They proposed that the domino effect derived from defaulting members as a bad 
example, was a significant determinant of repayment problems. They found that the role 
of group solidarity overweighed coercive peer pressure behavior on repayment rates. 
In contrast to the findings of Wenner (1995) and Sharma and Zeller (1997), 
Paxton et al. (2000) found that access to other sources of credit did not have a negative 
impact on a group’s repayment performance, but served as an indication of 
creditworthiness. In addition, defaults seemed to increase with subsequent loan cycles but 
were counteracted by the positive influence of adequate leadership and training. 
In summary, the existing empirical studies highlight the importance of intra-group 
insurance, risk diversification, social ties and location in driving the success or failure of 
groups. Group solidarity and risk diversification appear to be unambiguously linked with 
higher group loan repayment. 
Use of group member’s information for screening loan applicants using personal 
and social information improves repayment rates and reduces the effort in enforcing loan 
repayment. Some economic theorists suggest that other innovations like dynamic 
incentives such as progressively bigger loans combined with denial of new credit in case 
of failure in repaying loans represent important means to decrease loan default. Peer 
pressure within groups affects group performance positively, while the existence of other 
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Self-Help Groups in the same village seems to bear a negative impact on the groups’ 
performance (Verhelle and Berlage 2003). 
Eyo (2008) stated that “the success of a finance group in repaying group loans and 
in other group activities depend, in part, on the human capital of group members. Outside 
the personal characteristics of group members upon which social pressure is affirmed, 
their net worth in investment, managerial know how and knowledge of alternative 
sources of credit, as well as lending practices of the lenders are variables that affect their 
use of external finances vis a vis their willingness to join and become members of finance 
groups” (Eyo, 2008). 
According to Bhatt and Tang (2001) in designing group-based microfinance 
programs, membership in such informal credit networks was often limited to specific 
geographic areas and narrow kinship groups. These informal arrangements relied on 
various social networks and mechanisms to ensure conformance to mutually agreed upon 
contracts. Such arrangements thrived as a “business” in developing countries, and an 
informal credit market existed side-by-side with the formal one (Bhatt and Tang, 2001). 
The authors raised the question of whether group-based microfinance was an economic 
development intervention, or if it was an integrated approach to meeting the socio-
economic and political development needs of the poor? Some see the role of such 
programs largely in terms of meeting the capital needs of the poor but others also stress 
the positive impact of such schemes on human and social capital formation in some 
instances, and personal and political empowerment of the poor in others (Bhatt and Tang, 
2001). 
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The World Bank’s Community-Driven Development (CDD) initiative is part of 
the bottom-up approach to development. Rather than viewing poor people as the target of 
poverty-reduction efforts, CDD tries to treat poor people and their institutions as assets 
and partners in development. The CDD initiative is embedded in the idea of social 
capital, which refers to institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and 
quantity of social interactions. Evidence suggests that social cohesion is critical for 
economic prosperity and sustainable development. “Social capital is not just the sum of 
society’s institutions; it is the glue that holds them together” (World Bank 2005).  
Olejarova et al. (2003) explored the concept of social capital from the perspective 
of microfinance and studied the link between microfinance provision and social capital. 
Their study explained the links between social networks, poverty and the process of 
transition to open market economies in Central and Eastern Europe. They stated that there 
was a debate between definitions of social capital that are based on community and those 
that are based on trust. Their study used all of the most widely acknowledged social 
capital indicators such as trust, voluntary involvement, and political participation as a 
ground for their decisions about the relationship between social capital and microfinance. 
They stated, however, that obtaining a single, true measure of social capital was probably 
not possible. Contemporary researchers have had to compile indexes from a range of 
appropriate items like measures of trust, confidence, government, voting trends, social 
mobility, and others. Another way to measure social capital has been the use of 
membership in formal and informal groups and networks. Examples of this were 
demonstrated by Narayan (1997) who measure social capital by identifying individuals’ 
membership in informal and formal associations and networks in Tanzania; and Narayan 
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and Pritchett (1999) who developed an index of social capital at the household and 
community levels involving participation in formal and informal groups and networks.  
For practical reasons, in the proposed study political capital was considered a 
dimension of social capital. Therefore political capital was included with trust, 
reciprocity, norm and rules, and groups and networks as components for measuring social 
capital in the saving box groups that were studied. 
Political capital is related to the ability of a group to influence the rules and 
regulations that determine the distribution and utilization of resources within a social 
unit. Political capital includes organizational skills, networking and communication 
skills, influence, voice and power (Flora and Flora, 2004). 
According to Fey et al. (2006) political capital can be measured in terms of 
political empowerment. If the community group has this political clout, they are then able 
to mobilize resources in the way of economic and social capital, which is necessary for 
community change. What this may mean for small communities is that the CED group 
needs to engage those in town who already have political power and control over 
decision-making, so that others in the community will want to join the CED group and 
work toward community success. In this way, local people are making an investment in 
the community’s political capital to make an impact on CED efforts (Fey et al., 2006). 
Olejarova et al. (2003) linked microfinance, social capital formation, and political 
development in Russia and Eastern Europe. Their designed hypothesis and results of the 
wider impact study, which included three microfinance organizations, represented a pilot 
attempt to assess the contribution of microfinance to community-building and political 
participation. These authors found that microfinance apparently was not associated with 
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higher levels of formal association, but was associated with informal association, which 
can lead to informal political participation. 
Although most of the previous studies used repayment rates as a measure of the 
microfinance institution’s performance, for the present study the performance of the 
group was measured based on its survival status and savings and loan functioning. The 
hypothesis is that social capital in the saving box groups is a variable that is positively 
associated to the success of the survival and performance of the saving box group (Ho 1). 
2.3.2 Cultural capital 
 
Cultural capital is defined as the values and philosophies of life that have both 
economic and non-economic implications. Cultural capital is analogous to the filter 
through which people live their lives, the daily or seasonal rituals they observe, and their 
cosmovision or the way they regard the world around them. The socialization process 
serves to transmit values and cultural capital from a group to its members (Flora and 
Flora, 2004). Fey et al. (2006) used community traditions, festivals, and local history to 
study how the “culture” of a community changed or evolved. 
The cultural dimension involved in this study is represented by gender differences 
concerning participation in saving boxes. Women groups have been targeted as a 
strategic sector in fighting against poverty. Schreiner and Nagarajan (1998) predicted 
creditworthiness through publicly observable characteristics and concluded that some 
easily observable characteristics helped predict creditworthiness. Formal lenders can 
easily profit from informal lenders’ practices in that they consider females to be 
creditworthy. This assumption is made because at the village level, informal lenders are 
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good judges of creditworthiness and because females borrow from informal lenders more 
than males do. 
Women’s empowerment, according to Mayoux (2006) needed to be an integral 
part of public policy, and it was not an automatic outcome of microfinance programs. 
Other empowerment interventions should be included such as group development and 
complementary services (Mayoux, 2006). 
Decision making power related to various types of microfinance resources as a 
measure of women’s empowerment was analyzed by Wakoko (2003) in Uganda. She 
concluded that participation in informal financial groups was the most important 
microfinance resource promoting women’s empowerment in Ugandan rural households. 
The study recognized the limits of the transformative capacities of microfinance 
resources, especially of the more formal sources of credit, and that financial 
empowerment did not necessarily lead to a transformation in gender relationships. The 
author also advocated for an integrated approach to microfinance delivery in Uganda 
because the integrated informal sources offered the best opportunities for rural farmers in 
general and women in particular. 
Pitt et al. (2006) estimated the impact of participation in microcredit programs in 
women’s empowerment using a large set of qualitative responses to questions related to 
gender relationships within the household in a survey in rural Bangladesh between 1998 
and 1999. They concluded that women’s participation in micro credit programs helped 
increase women’s empowerment. Credit programs resulted in women taking a greater 
role in household decision making, having more access to financial and economic 
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resources, expanded social networks, and more freedom and mobility. Spousal 
communication about family planning and parenting concerns also improved.  
The general literature suggests that male entrepreneurs tended to divert a greater 
proportion of profits to reinvestments in an enterprise, while female entrepreneurs in 
developing countries tended to allocate a greater share of profits towards food, clothing, 
and other expenditures affecting family and child welfare and health (Wydick 2002). 
Jennings (1989), also found that female entrepreneurs had a primary goal of ensuring 
subsistence consumption for members of the household. While on the other hand, male 
entrepreneurs were greater risk-takers engaged in higher-yielding but potentially riskier 
projects.  
In a study about Self-Help Groups (SHGs), women empowerment, and social 
security in India, Reddy and Manak (2005) found that women’s participation in the local 
political arena increased through active involvement in SHGs. Women’s political 
engagement in local government included local assemblies and participation in public 
affairs, and civic issues, such as building a school or a health center, repairing eroded 
river bank lands and laying drinking water pipes. Impoverished women developed greater 
language and financial skills through the SHG which provided the basis for higher levels 
of confidence to engage in larger issues. Quinones (2000) in a Philippines case study 
about social capital in microfinance stated that women were more supportive of their 
group members, more patient, trustworthy and giving to their peers, and they had a 
deeper sense of shame. 
In a study about informal finance and microfinance in rural China and India, Tsai 
(2004) found that ROSCAs in Lin Village called ‘chenghui’ or ‘hui’ were only managed 
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by women because they had better developed social networks with one another, because 
they were more likely to remain in town year round (as opposed to men who may engage 
in seasonal migration), and because men were more likely to have other financial options. 
Women may have a comparative advantage for functioning within lending groups 
but not necessarily due to their responsiveness to shame sanctions according to Barr and 
Kinsley (2002) in a study in Zimbabwe. The comparative advantage of women in lending 
groups may be more related to the behavioral rules they have internalized, the way these 
rules interact with the general level of social interaction, and their effectiveness at 
sanctioning others who behave antisocially. 
However, access to financial sources by women does not guarantee that those 
resources positively impact the welfare of the household, especially related to children 
and women’s health, nutrition and schooling. In this regard Goetz and Sen Gupta (1999) 
assessed women’s loss of direct control over their loans. They concluded that access to 
loans did not necessarily benefit women’s or household welfare due to gender authority 
issues in the management of household assets. This study raised several issues for further 
research about the empowerment contribution of credit targeting women.  
 In the case of the present study, an important number of women have been 
participating in saving box groups. Women participation ranged from groups entirely 
composed by women to those in which they represented only a small proportion. Quality 
of women’s participation was also different among groups. In some groups women were 
ordinary members, while in other groups they performed key roles in the structure of the 
group such as leadership and organizational management. The second hypothesis for this 
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study is that women’s participation in leadership roles in the saving box group is 
positively associated to the saving box success and survival (Ho 2).  
2.3.3 Human capital 
 
Human capital is defined as the characteristics and potential of the community’s 
individuals as a result from the interaction between other human beings and the 
environment. These characteristics are related to a person’s knowledge, skills, 
capabilities, and potentials. Pretty and Hine (2000) defined human capital as the total 
capability residing in individuals, based on their level of knowledge, skills, health and 
nutrition. According to Coleman (1988), human capital is built by changes in people that 
bring about skills and capabilities that enable them to act in new ways. 
Alston (2004) argued that the loss of young people was a threat to the 
sustainability of rural communities. This is an indicator of the loss of future leaders, small 
business owners, entrepreneurs and community drivers (Alston, 2004). Fey et al. (2006) 
stated that communities sustain themselves over time in relation to their investments in 
education, health care, and youth retention in the CED effort; these are all important for 
attracting and keeping people in small rural areas, i.e. building human capital. 
Regarding administrative management of saving and credit programs, Morduch 
and Rutherford (2003) stated that saving and loan clubs faced problems in managing their 
microfinance schemes, because “good book-keeping is hard for the illiterate and without 
good book-keeping such devices are prone to abuse, carelessness, and collapse” 
(Morduch and Rutherford, 2003). Regardless of poverty level, people “prefer an 
individual service, the simplicity of having a reliable retailer look after the bookkeeping 
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instead of having to do it themselves, and prefer to avoid the risks involved in owning 
and managing their own mini-financial institution. This is especially true, they argue, of 
the very poor, who are often illiterate and ill-equipped to maintain a good set of books for 
anything but the simplest inflexible transactions over short periods” (Morduch and 
Rutherford, 2003). 
When Aniket (2005) studied the use of modified ROSCAs in microfinance, he 
concluded that group leaders were those that were economically better off and more 
educated than the rest of the group. The ordinary members had minimal education skills. 
He stated that education was the scarce resource among the impoverished. Among the 
benefits of lending groups was that these groups increased the “effective literacy” of the 
group. This came about when less educated individuals benefited from sharing the 
educational skills of the few but well educated in the group. 
While the achievements of women members in forming common groups to help 
themselves is remarkable, much more progress is needed to build the capabilities of the 
staff of SHGs. In this regard, NGOs play a key role in providing the support needed for 
establishing bookkeeping and accounting organizational structure, governance and other 
areas (Reddy and Manak 2005). 
Specifically for the present study, human capital is perceived as an asset residing 
in saving box groups. This variable is considered as a necessary ingredient for the 
successful performance of the group. Most of the literature shows that microfinance 
programs promote and help build human capital (Morduch and Rutherford, 2003; Reddy 
and Manak, 2005; Ghatak, 2002; Aniket, 2005); however, in the present study, human 
capital is regarded as a prerequisite for the saving box group. Human capital for this 
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study was measured by the average number of years of formal education of the treasurers 
of the saving box. Alternatively the number of treasures trained and involved in the 
saving box management was also considered as an indicator of human capital. The effect 
of training group members in administrative management of microfinance practices can 
be attributed to external promoters, named NGOs, governmental agencies, or university 
extension programs. Nonetheless, the final decision on who and how many members of 
the saving box group should be trained and advised resides in the group’s own dynamics. 
The importance of human capital in microfinance led to the third hypothesis of this study: 
human capital is positively associated to saving box success in terms of it survival status 
(Ho 3). 
2.3.4.. Financial capital 
 
Financial capital is related to all forms of currency and assets used for increasing 
financial capacity of the household. Financial capital includes credit and loans, 
investments, taxes, savings, tax reductions and refunds, scholarships and grants. 
According to Pretty and Hine (2000), financial capital is accumulated claims on goods 
and services built up through financial systems that gather savings and issue credit, such 
as pensions, remittances, welfare payments, grants and subsidies. 
Another kind of financial capital is termed “built capital”. This form of capital is 
built by humans to be used for the production of other capitals. Built capital is related to 
dwellings, roads, irrigation systems, water and drainage systems, health infrastructure, 
electronic communications, marketing and storage facilities, etc. 
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Flora et al. (2000) stated that human capital, social capital, natural capital, and 
financial/built capital were critical contributors to long-term sustainability. Campana et 
al. (2000) also mentioned that social, human, and financial capitals, if properly focused, 
can improve quality of life and the environment. 
According to Flora et al. (2001), it is much more difficult now for farmers to 
maintain a constant share of the value chain. These chains and the farmer’s proportional 
share tend to be driven by different relationships: first with input suppliers, particularly 
suppliers of knowledge; second with markets, particularly in reaching emerging markets; 
and finally with fellow producers in new models of cooperation. However, one more 
relationship is missing in this scenario of rapid globalization and modernization: access to 
financial opportunities, which is even more difficult for traditional, small farmers. 
Eyo (2008) suggested that for ensuring the success of community rural 
microfinance schemes, small farmers and those in the community with better net worth 
and better managerial skills should be adequately informed and encouraged to form or 
join informal groups and participate in the microfinance schemes. 
In this study financial capital is considered one of the factors –along with social 
capital, cultural capital, and human capital- that affect saving box performance and 
survival. Thus, a fourth hypothesis was established for this study: financial capital is 
positively associated to saving box success (Ho 4).  
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CHAPTER 3.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the research design, procedures used for collecting data 
and statistical tools for analyzing results. The chapter begins with a description of the 
research design and the saving box groups and member interviews, which represent the 
primary sources of information for this research, and is followed by a description of data 
collection from secondary sources (mainly group records, publications, theses, and 
project reports) and the research site, the target populations and their characteristics. I 
next describe the variables and their measurement, present the data analyses and discuss 
procedures to achieve reliability and validity. 
 
3.1 Research design 
 
This research was mainly conducted as a cross-sectional quantitative study; 
however, qualitative information has been collected to support and better explain 
quantitative findings. The study was focused on community rural microfinance groups 
called “saving boxes”, also known as informal finance groups (IFGs), which were the 
unit of analysis. Quantitative and qualitative information from key informants on each 
one of 34 groups in the Central Valleys of Puebla State of Mexico was recorded through 
personal interviews using a structured guide or protocol for interviewing. These 
interviews were addressed to the representatives and persons in charge of the saving box 
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and members of the group. A minimum of three persons per group were interviewed, 
notably the president and the treasurer, and at least one member of the saving box.  
Prior to the field work, the research design was evaluated considering pros and 
cons of using quantitative or qualitative approaches or both in the study. Due to the lack 
of previous information on the topic and place of study, a quantitative approach 
supported by qualitative data was considered the most appropriate research methodology.  
During the summer of 2005 I conducted an exploratory field study, which 
outcome was the categorization of the saving boxes into three levels of success and 
performance as informal finance community groups. Socioeconomic factors were 
considered as the most influential variables on the group’s performance, notably social, 
human, cultural, and financial capitals. 
My first-hand knowledge of the research groups and communities in Puebla, 
Mexico, allowed the field work to be conducted into the concentrated time-frame. I 
collected data for this study between July and August 2007. These data are supported and 
complemented by secondary data from publications like state and municipal census, 
yearbooks and statistics, theses, and technical reports from previous studies of the groups 
by research colleagues at the Colegio de Postgraduados. 
The major objective of the present study was to elucidate the sustainability of 
community groups through the relationship between a microfinance community scheme 
called saving box and socioeconomic factors affecting its performance. Such factors are 
social capital, human capital, cultural capital, and financial capital. Thus, a cross-
sectional study that utilized correlations and regression techniques was used to find 
relationships between the variables under study. The use of other methodologies such as 
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ethnographic or participant observation methods would not been have possible within the 
time-frame of the research and for the large number of groups included in this study. 
3.2  Questionnaire design 
 
A questionnaire was the primary data gathering process in the research. Using this 
instrument, both quantitative and qualitative data were collected; however, quantitative 
data predominated. Prior to the field work of data collection, a structured questionnaire 
was developed and refined at Iowa State University. The questionnaire was also 
developed as a protocol for interviewing using closed-ended and open-ended questions. 
Personal interviews were conducted with representatives and members of all of the 34 
informal finance groups (IFGs) or saving boxes. For the purpose of accurate reading and 
better sequencing of questions, the questionnaire was divided into seven parts as follows: 
The first part was the identification sheet, which contained the purpose of the 
interview and information about the researcher in charge. This part also contained site 
specific information (group, community, and municipality), and interviewee 
identification. From the second through the seventh part, the questionnaire was composed 
of items related to social capital, cultural capital, current status of the saving box, 
financial capital, human capital, and political capital. The date and interviewer were 
registered in the last part. Quantitative and qualitative data were collected at the same 
time in each part. Closed-ended questions predominated in the questionnaire to produce a 
large amount of information in the short time-frame and to provide an easier way to code 
data and statistically analyze and interpret the data. Open-ended items were included in 
the questionnaire to provide more detailed understanding about the interviewee’s 
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opinions, perceptions, and to record concrete examples for illustrating their responses. A 
combination of both kinds of questions in the same questionnaire allowed a better 
understanding and explanation of the precise responses given by interviewees.  
 
3.3  Secondary research 
 
Secondary sources of information were also analyzed, such as the group’s records 
of savings deposits and loans, and technical and financial reports from the advising team. 
Previous research done in the area, field-notes, and recorded observations from the 
experiences of previous researchers were also used. Group records were consulted for 
general information about the saving box development process, such as original goals and 
objectives, membership, participant actors and association with regional organizations.  
Also data were taken in saving and loan records like amount saved per member and total 
by period, frequency and amount of savings, loan size, terms and repayment, moroseness 
or arrears, defaults, types and rates of interest, purpose of loans, common fund growth, 
and other items. Group records were also consulted for specific data to be used as 
indicators or variables in the study like gender composition and leadership roles played 
by women in the group (used as indicators of cultural capital), meeting frequency (used 
as indicator to construct social capital), and treasurer’s schooling average and number of 
treasurers and members trained for the saving box management (used as indicators to 
construct human capital). Publications also were consulted, especially those closely 
related to rural microfinance schemes and saving boxes in Puebla and Mexico, notably 
graduate theses and evaluation reports. Technical and financial reports elaborated by the 
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team advising the W.K. Kellogg Foundation were also consulted. This information 
allowed one to contrast the technicians’ data with those from the group’s records, and 
perceptions from the advising team and its executive director. Researcher field notes 
written from the beginning of the saving boxes from 1998 through 2003 were also 
consulted in the research process. 
 
3.4 Research setting 
 The focus of this study was on informal finance groups (IFGs) known as saving 
boxes. The research included all 34 saving box groups in the region under study so a 
sample analysis was not used. Data collection from the total population of saving boxes 
was used to establishing relationships between the success or failure of the microfinance 
scheme and socioeconomic factors as predictors of that outcome. 
The region of the Central Valleys of Puebla is geographically bordered in the 
north by the Malintzi mountain and the state of Tlaxcala. In the west the natural borders 
are the Popocatepetl and Iztaccihuatl volcanoes. The natural limits in the south are the 
Tentzo Cordillera and Atlixco Valley, and the eastern borders are  the Valleys of 
Acatzingo and Tecamachalco. 
The study area was divided in three different ecological zones: 1) step lands in the 
Popocatepetl, Iztaccihuatl, and Malintzi volcanoes, 2) fertile and irrigated lands in the 
valley, and 3) poor rain-fed soils and dry lands in the Tentzo Cordillera. Initially in the 
study, the relationship of the three ecological zones with saving box performance was 
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considered; however, statistical analysis showed no significant relationship between 
ecological zones and savings box performance. 
The total population in the Central Valleys of Puebla was 2,119,291 inhabitants, 
including the capital city of Puebla and its metropolitan area (INEGI, 1995). The 34 
small-farmers’ groups were located in 24 rural communities divided into 13 
municipalities in the Central Valleys of Puebla (Figure 1). The total population for these 
municipalities was 332, 462 inhabitants. However, the target population for this study 
was comprised of 684 small farmers (377 men and 307 women). These 34 groups were 
previously assessed and categorized according to their organizational group performance 
and current organizational status as a saving box. Saving box performance were 
categorized into good, regular, and poor performance as defined in the following section 
3.5. Table 1 shows how the target population was classified by performance or survival 
status and by gender. Table 2 shows the entire population classified by group, community 
municipality and gender of the members. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Population distribution by group success and gender 
 GROUPS MEMB GOOD 
GR       MEMB 
REGULAR 
GR      MEMB 
POOR 
GR      MEMB 
WOMEN 10 
30% 
209 
31% 
2 
6% 
58 
9% 
7 
21% 
123 
18% 
1 
3% 
28 
4% 
MEN 12 
35% 
227 
33% 
2 
6% 
33 
5% 
5 
15% 
99 
16% 
5 
15% 
95 
14% 
MIX 12 
35% 
248 
36% 
5 
15% 
131 
19% 
6 
18% 
102 
15% 
1 
3% 
15 
2% 
TOTAL 34 
100% 
684 
100% 
9 
26.5% 
222 
33% 
18 
53% 
324 
47% 
7 
20.5% 
138 
20% 
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3.5 Operationalization and measurement of variables 
 
 This section is focused on the conceptual and operational definitions of variables 
and indicators. In this study indicators were the measurable empirical evidence used to 
estimate level of capital. A conceptual definition for each variable involved in the study 
is given followed by an operational definition, which refers to the way which that 
variable is understood. Finally, a measurement scale is given for each variable and 
indicator. 
 
The dependent variable: Success or performance of the saving box  
The “saving box” as a community microfinance scheme was categorized into 
three levels of performance based on current activity of the saving box in gathering 
savings, issuing loans, drawing interest, recovering loans, keeping records, and meeting 
members: The three identified categories were: 
Good performance: Currently working well, performing all the necessary tasks of 
savings and loans, group resources and social fund were increasing; internal group 
communication and collective member activities were strong. 
Average performance: Currently no savings were gathered and no new loans were 
granted; all the money was placed in loans, interests were gathered and in some cases 
loans were being recovered; group’s members remained in contact and met sometimes. 
Group resources and social fund were steady or slowly increasing. 
Poor performance: Groups that were not working or were dismantled, and it was 
difficult to meet as a saving box group. They had no group resources or social fund. 
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The variable success or performance of the saving box group was coded as 1, 2 
and 3 for poor, average and good performance, respectively. 
 
Independent variables 
Social Capital 
In this study social capital was composed of six indicators: 1) relations of trust, 2) 
reciprocity and exchange, 3) common rules, norms and sanctions, 4) connectedness, 
networks and groups, 5) meeting frequency, and 6) participation in political decisions. 
These six indicators were measured using a five-point ordinal likert-scale. 
(1) Relations of trust referred to the existence and intensity of confidence among 
group members, between members and their group representatives, and between them 
and their local authorities. The answers from the interviews were coded as 1 for very low, 
2 for low, 3 for regular, 4 for high, and 5 for very high level of intensity. The final scale 
was constructed with the average among the three indices (trust in other group members, 
trust in group’s representatives, and trust in local authorities).  
(2) Reciprocity and exchange referred to the existence and intensity of community 
schemes of self-help and solidarity, and ways of interchange in kind, labor or other forms 
of exchange among community members. This indicator, measured as intensity, was 
coded as 1 for very low, 2 for low, 3 for regular, 4 for high, and 5 for very high intensity. 
(3) Common rules, norms and sanctions were used to estimate the existence and 
observance of written or unwritten internal guidelines used for regulating group and 
member activities. These data specifically related to their “internal rule-book”. The 
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intensity level of this indicator was coded as 1 for very low, 2 for low, 3 for regular, 4 for 
high, and 5 for very high. 
(4) Connectedness, networks and groups were used to estimate the existence and 
participation in local and regional groups and networks. Two types of networks (bonding 
and bridging) were used in this study. Bonding networks referred to the participation in 
groups and networks in the community such as church, school, political parties, 
community action, productive projects, etc. This index was measured in terms of 
participation intensity and was coded as 1 for very low, 2 for low, 3 for regular, 4 for 
high, and 5 for very high. 
Bridging networks referred to the community member’s relationships outside the 
community with other farmers’ organizations, regional organizations, private institutions 
(NGO’s), and public institutions (government agencies). This index was measured as the 
intensity of interaction and was coded as 1 for very low, 2 for low, 3 for regular, 4 for 
high, and 5 for very high. The final indicator for connectedness, networks and groups was 
constructed from the average of bridging and bonding network indices. 
(5) Meeting frequency. Meeting frequency of the group was considered a 
component of social capital for the purposes of this study. Meeting frequency of the 
group was coded as 1 for never, 2 for once every two months, 3 for monthly, 4 for every 
two weeks, and 5 for weekly. 
(6) Political capital was assessed in terms of group and member participation in 
political decision making at the local level, and their ability to negotiate with other 
groups, and public and private institutions. Political capital was measured through the 
participation intensity of the group in community decisions and member participation in 
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local government, and the group’s bargaining power. Participation intensity in 
community decisions and participation in local government were coded as 1 for very low, 
2 for low, 3 for regular, 4 for high, and 5 for very high. Negotiation power was a 
dichotomous answer and coded as 0 for none and 1 for yes. 
In summary, the final value for social capital was calculated as an average as 
follows: 
Social capital = [Index of Trust (members + representatives + and authorities/3) + Index 
of Reciprocity + Index of Rules + Index of Networks (bonding networks + bridging 
networks/2)+ Index of Meeting + Political Capital(decision influence + local 
government/2 + negotiation power)] /6 
This variable construction was validated through the Cronbach’s alpha index in 
order to measure the internal reliability for multiple-item indices. For this case the 
Cronbach’s alpha index was 0.9323, which was a good indicator of internal reliability 
considering the expected indices are alpha values of 0.70 or higher (Knoke, et al., 2002). 
 
Cultural Capital 
In the case of the present study, cultural capital was assessed in terms of the 
quality of women’s participation in leadership roles in the saving box group. The 
measurement of women’s participation was made using a combination of frequency and 
quality of women’s participation in representative or leadership roles in the group. The 
scale was 0 to 5, with 0 assigned for groups with no women’s participation, 1 for one 
woman or one leadership position performed by a woman (president, secretary or 
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treasurer), 2 for two leadership positions, 3 for three leadership positions, 4 for more than 
three leadership positions, and 5 for groups comprised entirely by women. 
 
Financial Capital 
Financial capital was composed of all forms of access to monetary resources and 
assets used to increase productive capacity of the group member’s households. Financial 
capital was comprised of credit and loans, savings, investments tax reductions or refunds, 
remittances, scholarships and grants. According to Pretty and Hine (2000), financial 
capital is accumulated claims on goods and services, built up through financial systems 
that gather savings and issue credit, such as pensions, remittances, welfare payments, 
grants and subsidies. For this research, financial capital was defined as the household’s 
diversity in sources of money and assets, access to financial services –formal or informal, 
and the existence of built capital of the group. 
Household financial capital referred to the different ways and sources by which 
individual households accessed monetary resources, such as crop and livestock sales, 
handicrafts and small trade, off-farm wages, remittances, grants, scholarships, refunds, 
welfare payments, etc. This indicator was measured by the number of income sources of 
the households in the group. 
Access to financial services was measured by the use of savings and loan services 
from formal or informal sources. This was a dichotomous response from the 
interviewees. 
Built capital referred to the group’s assets or material resources for farm 
production and commercialization, which were collectively owned. In this study 
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observations of built capital such as irrigation systems, buildings, warehouses, 
agricultural machinery and equipment, transportation, communication, etc. were 
recorded. This indicator was measured as 0 for none and 1 for yes. 
The internal reliability for this variable construction was measured through the 
Cronbach’s alpha index, which was derived from the correlations between the three 
involved indicators (sources of income, access to savings and loans, and built capital) 
with the constructed variable. The Cronbach’s alpha was 0.8098 and was considered a 
good indicator of the internal reliability of the variable. 
 
Human Capital 
In this study human capital was measured in two ways. One was by the formal 
schooling average (measured in years) of the saving box treasurers in charge of the 
management tasks. The second was by the number of individuals with specific skills for 
managing the saving box that were acquired by training after participating in the saving 
box group. This number was the total number of current and past treasurers for each 
saving box group.  
 
3.6 Data analysis 
 
This research was conducted as a cross-sectional study utilizing a quantitative 
component and a questionnaire of structured interviews for data collection, involving all 
of the 34 groups. 
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The statistical approach utilized correlational and simple and multiple regression 
analyses through the Ordinal Logistic Regression technique, since the dependent variable 
was considered ordinal. The computational tool used to perform the statistical analysis 
was SAS (Statistical Analysis System). 
The measurement of the dependent variable (SUCCESS) was categorized into 
three levels (good, regular, and poor) and was considered ordinal. The measurement of 
the independent variable social capital (SOCCAP) was made from a five-point likert-
scale, which according to Demaris (2004), the variable is ordinal but has enough levels to 
be treated as ‘approximately’ continuous. In the case of human capital (HUMCAP) a 
continuous variable was used, which consisted of the average number of years of formal 
schooling of the treasurers. Human capital was also measured by the number of persons 
trained in the management of the saving and loan scheme; however this measurement 
was not used in the statistical analysis. Cultural capital (CULCAP) was represented by 
the number of leadership positions performed by women in the group and the proportion 
of women participating in each group (% of women); both were considered continuous 
variables, and only the first one was used in the statistical analysis because it reflects 
more accurately women’s influence in group performance. Finally, financial capital 
(FINCAP) was constructed by the number of income sources of the members including 
access to saving and loan sources, and built capital owned by the group; this variable was 
also considered continuous. 
Before the regression analysis, a set of descriptive statistics for the targeted 
variables were reviewed in order to better understand the characteristics of the saving box 
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groups such as: frequency distribution, mean, standard deviation, and maximum and 
minimum value for each variable. 
A correlation matrix was constructed involving all five variables (one dependent 
and four independent) to preview significant correlations. Correlation values associated 
to a probability equal to or smaller than five percent (p<.05) to commit Type I or alpha 
error, caused a rejection of the true null hypothesis of no relationship between the two 
variables (Knoke et al. 2002). 
Bivariate regression analysis was used in the first step to find significant 
associations between the dependent variable (sustainability or survival status, measured 
by performance level of the saving box) and each one of the independent variables (social 
capital, human capital, cultural capital, and financial capital) in order to asses the 
suitability of using simple and multiple ordered logistic regression analyzes. 
Multiple Ordered Logistic Regression analysis was conducted by regressing the 
four independent variables (predictors) against the outcome variable as a fully recursive 
model. The interpretation of the logistic regression was focused on the test for 
Proportional Odds Assumption (POA) to be sure that the proper statistical procedure for 
ordered logistic regression was used (Chi-Square); Model Fit Statistics, Testing Global 
Null Hypothesis, Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates (regression coefficients), 
Effect of Point Estimate (odds ratio), and Confidence Limits. 
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3.7  Reliability and validity issues 
 
 Reliability of the research procedure and the research instrument to collect 
primary data is a critical concept related to the ability of the instrument to consistently 
measure the variables under study (Babbie, 1998; Knoke et al., 2002). To be sure that the 
instrument consistently measured the variables under study, clarity and specificity of the 
questions were considered. Also, the prior experience of the researcher in field extension 
program evaluation through survey studies was a factor to assure a reliable data 
collection process.  
There are inherent shortcomings especially when interviews are made in one 
single visit; however, the accessibility to the rural communities and availability of 
transportation allowed the researcher to conduct a second visit to clarify or to 
complement answers from the respondents. In designing the protocol for interviews some 
considerations were taken into account: a) logic, b) phrasing, 3) sequencing, and 4) time 
to complete the interview. 
The internal reliability for multiple-item indices construction, such as for social 
capital and financial capital, was measured through the Cronbach’s alpha index, and the 
values for both social and financial capitals were larger than 0.7. 
Validity is understood as the degree to which the operationalization of a variable 
accurately reflects the concept that is intended to measure (Knoke et al., 2002). Or in 
other words, is the concept measuring what it tries to measure? And is the interviewee 
understanding and answering what the researcher believes s/he is asking (Babbie, 1998). 
This study first relied on face validity measures, second on theoretical 
assumptions, and third that the entire population was under study and no sample was 
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utilized to make inferences. Face validity was supported by an accurate translation of the 
questionnaire into Spanish and a clear reading of the questions to the respondents. The 
research was guided by theoretical perspectives on rural community groups, social 
networks, and rural microfinance schemes.  
The validity of the concept of group sustainability, in terms of the success of the 
saving box, was composed of indicators that reflected the actual status or performance of 
the saving box. 
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Figure 3. Location of the study area in the state of Puebla, Mexico 
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Table 2. Groups and participants by community, municipality and gender 
Group Community Municipality Members  
TotalM W 
Tzilqueyotl Santa Cruz Ajajalpan Tecali de Herrera  0 15 15 
Agricultores Unidos  La Trinidad 
Tianguismanalco 
Tecali de Herrera 13 29 42 
Uparmex  La Trinidad 
Tianguismanalco  
Tecali de Herrera 6 8 14 
Tlanamaconi La Trinidad 
Tianguismanalco 
Tecali de Herrera 7 9 16 
Morelos  Colonia Morelos  Cuautinchan  10 5 15 
Guitlalotla  Aquiles Serdán  Tecali de Herrera 5 9 14 
Santa Cruz El Calvario  Santa Cruz el Calvario  San Juan Tzicatlacoyan  9 8 17 
Cuaxixtla  La Magdalena 
Cuaxixtla  
Tecali de Herrera 11 4 15 
El Oro Español Santa Isabel Tepetzala Santa María Acajete  25 4 29 
Malintzi T. Tucker Nuestra Señora del 
Monte  
Santa María Acajete  16 9 25 
Santa Ma. Ixtiyucan Santa María Ixtiyucan  Nopalucan  9 6 15 
Atlantepetzi San Simón Coatepec  Mixtla  15 4 19 
Concepción Cuautla  Concepción Cuautla  Tecali de Herrera 11 6 17 
Tepeyolotl Concepción Cuautla  Tecali de Herrera 14 17 31 
Progreso Reforma 
Tepulco 
San Juan Tepulco  Santa María Acajete  20 0 20 
Pinahuizatl Santa María Acajete  Santa María Acajete  9 15 24 
Productores de La 
Preciosita  
La Preciosita  Santa Rita Tlahuapan 22 0 22 
Productores de Las 
Dalias  
Guadalupito las Dalias  Santa Rita Tlahuapan 14 0 14 
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Table 2. (Continued) 
Group Community Municipality Members  
TotalM W 
La Unión de San 
Francisco  
San Francisco la Unión Santa Rita Tlahuapan 15 0 15 
SPR Pozo No. 1 Santa 
Bárbara  
Santa Bárbara 
Almoloya  
San Pedro Cholula 21 13 34 
SPR La Magueyera – El 
Manantial  
Santa María Zacatepec Juan Crisóstomo Bonilla  10 1 11 
El Crisol de Calpultitlan  San Mateo Calpultitlan Huejotzingo  9 2 11 
El Coltzi Santiago Coltzingo  Santa Rita Tlahuapan 17 1 18 
Vaqueros de 
Hueyacatitla  
San Andrés 
Hueyacatitla  
San Salvador el Verde  33 7 40 
Progreso de San Miguel  San Miguel 
Tianguistengo  
Santa Rita Tlahuapan 15 0 15 
Estación Tecuanipan  San Jerónimo 
Tecuanipan  
San Jerónimo 
Tecuanipan  
12 1 13 
Confecciones Rox  San Miguel 
Tianguistengo  
Santa Rita Tlahuapan 14 14 28 
Campesinas de Las 
Dalias  
Guadalupito Las Dalias Santa Rita Tlahuapan 0 15 15 
Grupo Unido para el 
Mañana  
La Preciosita  Santa Rita Tlahuapan 0 28 28 
Campesinas de La 
Preciosita  
La Preciosita  Santa Rita Tlahuapan 0 14 14 
Mujeres Unidas al 
Progreso 
San Andrés 
Hueyacatitla  
San Salvador el Verde  0 24 24 
PRODEHCO  San Andrés 
Hueyacatitla  
San Salvador el Verde  3 10 13 
Unidas por un Bienestar 
Mejor  
San Francisco la Unión Santa Rita Tlahuapan 5 6 11 
La Granjita de 
Hueyotlipan  
Santo Tomás 
Hueyotlipan  
Santo Tomas 
Hueyotlipan  
7 23 30 
       T o t a l     34                      24                     13 377 307 684 
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CHAPTER 4.  PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
In this chapter the major findings of the study are described and discussed. The 
main guideline for  presentation of results was the test of hypothesis stated in Chapter 2 
section 3, which was related to the relationships between the independent variables, 
notably social capital, cultural capital, human capital, and financial capital, and the 
dependent variable: the success level of the saving box group in terms of its performance 
and survival status over time. For each stated hypothesis, the results are presented first 
from bivariate analysis such as Pearson correlations and simple ordered logistic 
regression, and second from multiple ordered logistic regression. 
Empirical evidence about microfinance programs was used to help assess success 
and related factors, assuming the underlying idea that microfinance programs promote 
and build capitals such as human, social, cultural, and financial. However, in this research 
it was assumed the reverse relationship. The degree of success in terms of survival status 
of saving box groups, required a minimum of such capitals residing in the groups and 
individuals before external interventions take place. 
 
4.1 Correlation analysis 
 
A correlation matrix was initially used in contrasting all the intervening variables 
in order to identify significant associations between pairs of them. As shown in Table 3, 
all the independent variables, [SOCCAP (social capital), HUMCAP (human capital), 
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FINCAP (financial capital), and CULCAP (cultural capital)] were positively correlated to 
the dependent variable SUCCESS (success level of the saving box group). Pearson 
correlation coefficients were used to measure association degree between pairs of 
variables. Social capital association strength with success was higher than financial 
capital and human capital with success, respectively. These three correlations were highly 
significant (p< .01) while cultural capital was still correlated with success at a significant 
level of p< .05. 
Two pairs of independent variables were also correlated with each other. Social 
capital was highly correlated to human capital (p< .01); and human capital was correlated 
to financial capital (p< .05). This collinearity among the independent variables (capitals) 
may limit measuring the effects of the independents variables on the outcome variable as 
shown later in the logistic regression analysis. 
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Table 3.  Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables measured in the study 
________________________________________________________________________ 
  SUCCESS SOCCAP HUMCAP FINCAP CULCAP 
SUCCESS 1.00 
 
SOCCAP 0.69**  1.00  
   <.0001 
 
HUMCAP 0.46**  0.48**  1.00 
   0.0060  0.0039 
 
FINCAP 0.52**  0.32  0.36*  1.00 
   0.0015  0.0642  0.0352 
 
CULCAP 0.38*  0.17  0.08  0.21  1.00 
   0.0247  0.3429  0.6288   0.2415 
 
Mean  2.06882 3.50000 5.73529 3.88235 2.29412 
Std Dev 0.69375 0.82572 1.94327 0.68599 1.74997 
N  34  34  34  34  34 
________________________________________________________________________ 
** Significant at p< 0.01 
  * Significant at p< 0.05 
 
4.2 Social capital 
 
Hypothesis 1: The stated hypothesis is that social capital in the saving box groups 
is a variable positively associated to the survival and success of the saving box group. 
The null hypothesis is stated as: the success of saving box groups is independent of their 
social capital. 
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A positive and strong relationship existed between SOCCAP and SUCCESS as 
indicated by a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.68769, with a p value smaller than 
0.0001 (Table 3). The results from a simple ordered logistic regression (Table 4) was 
consistent with this observed relationship. The regression coefficient (B) or maximum 
likelihood estimate was 2.5521 with a p value of 0.0006 and the odds ratio (OR) was 
12.834. The multiple ordered logistic regressions in a full model including all the 
independent variables (SOCCAP, HUMCAP, FINCAP, and CULCAP), showed 
significant values for the regression coefficients (slopes) of SOCCAP and CULCAP 
(Table 5). These regression coefficients were 2.6871 with a p value of 0.0037 for 
SOCCAP and 0.612 with an associated p value of 0.0377 for CULCAP. The 
corresponding ORs were 14.69 and 1.844, respectively for SOCCAP and CULCAP. In 
contrast, the regression coefficients for HUMCAP and FINCAP were not significant with 
values of 0.2091 with a p value of 0.4450 and 1.4887 with a p value of 0.0806 for 
HUMCAP and FINCAP, respectively (Table 5).  
Regarding social capital (SOCCAP), it was observed that going from a simple to a 
more complex model with a greater number of variables involved, the B (regression 
coefficients) values increased from 2.5521 to 2.6871. The OR increased from 12.834 to 
14.69 indicating that a one unit increase in social capital would result in 14.69 units of 
increase in the ordered log-odds scale for the success of saving box while the other 
variables in the model were held constant. In simple words, the OR value of 14.69 means 
that for each unit of social capital added, the success likelihood for the saving box is 
increased almost 15 times. The -2 Log L (negative two multiplied by the log likelihood) 
value decreased from 47.775 to 35.290 from the simplest to the more complex model. 
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This results indicated that the complex model improved the ability of the independent 
variables to predict the dependent variable. 
These results strongly supported the first hypothesis that social capital was 
positively associated to the success of saving boxes. The association between the two 
variables of SUCCESS and SOCCAP was a causal relationship. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Simple ordered logistic regression between SUCCESS and SOCCAP 
(N=34) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Independent variable        Maximum  Probability Odds ratio      POA 
             Likelihood estimates pr > ChiSq  estimates  pr > ChiSq 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SOCCAP   2.5521** 0.0006  12.834  0.8542 
 
-2 Log L 47.775 
________________________________________________________________________ 
** Significant at p< 0.01 
  * Significant at p< 0.05 
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Table 5. Multiple ordered logistic regression between SUCCESS and SOCCAP, 
HUMCAP, FINCAP, and CULCAP, full model (N=34) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Independent variable        Maximum  Probability Odds ratio      POA 
             Likelihood estimates pr > ChiSq  estimates  pr > ChiSq 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SOCCAP   2.6871** 0.0037  14.690  0.1595 
HUMCAP   0.2091  0.4450    1.233 
FINCAP   1.4887  0.0606    4.431 
 
CULCAP   0.6120* 0.0377    1.844  
 
-2 Log L 35.290   
______________________________________________________________________ 
** Significant at p< 0.01 
  * Significant at p< 0.05 
 
 This hypothesis confirmation is concordant with findings from other research 
studies. Wenner (1995) found among 25 Costa Rican credit groups, repayment 
performance was better in groups engaged in active screening of their members, which 
can be assumed as a form of social capital. The author also argued that the existence of a 
written code and the social pressure of reputation helped decrease loan default and 
delinquency. In a study of 137 Guatemalan borrowing groups, Wydick (1999) found that 
peer monitoring and intra group insurance were determinants for lending group success. 
Social sanctions play a secondary and supportive role. However, the researcher 
concluded that group lending may be less effective in areas where social ties are strong. 
This is contrary to what was found in the present study, in which social capital had a 
strong positive, relationship to saving box group success. Regarding kinship and loan 
size, Sharma and Zeller (1997) found in Bangladesh that a high proportion of relatives 
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within a group and larger loans had a negative effect on group performance. In the 
present study, this effect was especially observed for failed groups, which more 
frequently loaned to family subgroups, made bigger loans, and showed irregular loan 
recovery. The presence of external ties with public and private institutions played a 
significant positive role on those groups that showed success, especially supplying key 
services like training and organizational support. Something similar was reported by 
Paxton et al. (2000) in 140 credit groups in Burkina Faso. They found that the role of 
group solidarity overweighed cohesive peer pressure behavior and suggested 
strengthening leadership and training to counteract negative effects such as default. 
The positive relationship between social capital and saving box success seemed to 
be related to the ability of groups to better deal with the lack of financial services meeting 
their necessities than by individual efforts. Moreover, working in groups has been more 
successful than individual efforts in obtaining funding for their collective projects. 
Solidarity within the group also plays a cohesive role. This is not related to joint liability 
but rather to collective action searching for two kinds of microfinance services: access to 
loans as saving box clients and access to savings with interest revenues as saving box 
owners. 
These findings were also supported by qualitative information gathered during the 
field research process from group member’s opinions, group records, and microfinance 
program files (Appendix A). Most of the saving box groups were created into formally 
constituted small farmers groups. This proportion represented 85% of the total, and from 
this percentage 93% of the groups were legally recognized as Social Solidarity Societies 
(SSS); the remaining 7% were Societies of Rural Production (SPR). The former kind of 
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group was established by the “Ley de Socidades de Solidaridad Social” (Law of Social 
Solidarity Societies), (D.O.F. May 27th, 1976) and the latter group by the “Ley Agraria” 
(Agrarian Law), (D.O.F. July 9th, 1993). The remaining 15% was composed of groups 
that did not have legal status; all of them were women groups which were formed mainly 
for two reasons: to start the savings box and to look for funding for collective projects. 
Land tenure among the savings box groups was predominantly under the social 
ownership form of ejido (32% of the groups) and a combination of this form with small 
property holders (53%), a low proportion was small property holders only (5%). In terms 
of group age, the oldest group dated from 1976. Most of the groups started between 1991 
and 1996 (74%); however, some groups (20%), especially women’s, were initiated in 
1998 at the same time when the saving box was started. Two of the groups (6%) were 
created specifically as a saving box group and the rest (94%) were created primarily to 
search for external resources for funding collective, productive projects. These projects 
were mostly associated with crop production (grain and forages such as corn, beans, 
barley, oats, alfalfa), backyard husbandry (cows, hogs, goats, sheep, and rabbits), poultry 
(chickens and turkeys), dairy production, irrigation systems, edible mushroom 
production, fruits (peaches, pears, plums, apples, apricots) and fruit tree nurseries 
(peaches). However, other kinds of projects included corn mills and tortilla making, 
grocery stores, sewing shops and clothes, confection, bakery, acquisition and operation of 
agricultural machinery, farming inputs supply, and natural resource conservation (soil, 
water, and reforestation). 
The main external actors participating in the promotion and establishment of the 
groups were scientists at the Colegio de Postgraduados for 82% of the groups, a NGO 
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named Enlace y Comunicacion, A.C. (Liaison and Communication, Civil Association), 
which intervened in 12% of the groups, and the Secretary of Rural Development (SDR) 
of the Puebla State and the National Union of Farming Workers (UNTA) who 
participated in 3% of the groups, respectively. 
In order to illustrate the construction of the variable social capital using its 
indicators: trust, reciprocity, norms and rules, groups and networks, political capital, and 
meeting frequency, some important information from the respondents is described as 
follows: 
Trust referred to relations of trust among group members, member’s trust in their 
group representatives, and member’s trust in their local authorities. The most consistent 
and stated reason of trust among group members was that most of them were relatives, 
neighbors, and friends that knew each other well. They worked together in harmony and 
some of the groups were still managing collective projects in addition to the saving box. 
These feelings of trust in general existed among all groups regardless of group 
performance or success status of the saving box. 
A member’s trust in their group representatives for successful groups was 
illustrated by good opinions of leaders and good information flow. In the case of failed 
groups, the opinions of members were related to a poor representative’s performance, 
especially the treasurer, internal division by families, and difficulties in recovering loans. 
For regular performing groups, problems existed in meeting after repayment of the seed 
capital. After reimbursement of seed capital and distribution of savings and interest 
gained among the members, saving box’s funds were reduced to its minimal amount or 
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even zero. Then, restarting again without a common fund was not possible for most of 
those groups. 
 In the same fashion a member’s trust in their local authorities was illustrated by 
their opinions related to good communication to local authorities due to kinship ties. 
Negative opinions were mainly related to the lack of communication and lack of 
participation in community decision making. 
 The most common form of reciprocity observed among groups was “faena”, 
which is a social practice consisting of required labor donation especially for community 
projects such as school and church remodeling, streets, roads, and public maintenance. 
This reciprocity also included community work, volunteering as local authorities, judges 
of peace, police, band musicians, dancers, pubic writers, and others. Other common 
forms of reciprocity were labor and seed exchange among relatives, neighbors and 
friends. Donations in cash were also a common practice for community material 
improvements, religious celebrations, and civic festivities. 
 The main indicator for norms and rules was the observance of internal bylaws or 
written codes. This instrument governs a group’s functioning in general and a saving 
box’s management in particular. These written rules included economic fines among the 
main sanctions for nonattendance at group meetings and activities, and delays in 
depositing savings after a designated due date. However, most of the groups did not 
impose monetary fines because they considered it unnecessary. One opinion in failed 
groups was that at the end, members stopped depositing savings, paying interest and 
repaying loans and group representatives lost influential control over the individual 
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members. Other groups returned all savings and benefits to it members, and failed to re-
start after distributing the financial resources. 
 A saving box group’s participation in other groups and networks can be 
categorized into three different kinds of networking. (1) relationships with other groups 
within the same community; (2) group participation with other groups at the regional 
level; and (3) their connections with external agents at institutional levels such as NGOs 
and governmental agencies. 
 At the community level, the most important networking of the saving boxes 
occurred in activities related to school and church groups. However, this communication 
was done more as individuals or families rather than as a group. Participation in ejido 
meetings and irrigation societies were also mentioned as important networking activities.  
 About two thirds of the groups originally belonged to one of two regional 
organizations for small farmers. The Federation of Social Solidarity Societies of the 
Tentzo Cordillera (FESSSCOT) included 14 saving box groups (41%), while the Plan 
Puebla Integrated Farming, Civil Association (IAPPAC), included 9 saving box groups 
(27%). The remaining 11 groups (32%) were independent. These two regional 
organizations no longer exist; however, most of the saving box groups are still working 
by themselves. 
 External relationships with private and public institutions were also clearly 
evident among saving box groups. These farmers groups had the most frequent contact 
with Colegio de Postgraduados, the Puebla State’s Rural Development Secretary (SDR), 
and the federal Secretary of Agriculture (SAGARPA). Other public institutions 
mentioned with less frequency were Secretary of Social Development (SEDESOL), and 
  
74
 
National Water Commission (CNA). The most frequent contacts with private institutions 
were with a NGO named “Enlace y Comunicacion AC” and a credit union named “Union 
de Credito Mixta del Plan Puebla” (Mixed Credit Union of the Plan Puebla). Despite the 
institutional contact, the general concern about public and private institutional services 
was the lack or insufficient support from them. Some specific projects were highlighted 
as good institutional support examples, such as saving box training, monitoring, and 
follow up; productive projects; women projects; food sufficiency projects; and others in 
the social and community action side. 
 Political participation at community level was generally related to individual 
rather than group action. Few groups registered influence in local authority and directly 
involving some group member in local community decision making (20%). Just two 
groups (6%) recognized themselves as having a specific affiliation with a political party. 
Most of the groups had little or no influence in political policy decision making either as 
a group or individually. 
 Group meeting frequency was related to saving box success. Groups that met 
weekly, every two weeks, and monthly had greater member involvement and 
participation in group activities and were better informed about the saving box 
management and group performance. The purpose of these meetings were to gather 
savings, grant loans, and deal with current issues related to the saving box and collective 
projects. 
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4.3. Cultural capital 
 
Hypothesis 2: A second hypothesis in this study was that the quality and 
proportion of women’s participation in leadership roles in the saving box group was 
positively associated with saving box success. The null hypothesis was stated as the 
quality and proportion of women participation in saving box groups had no effect in its 
success in terms of survival status and performance. 
 The correlation coefficient between SUCCESS and CULCAP of 0.38469 was 
significant with an associated p value of 0.0247 (Table 3). This correlation suggested a 
significant relationship between these two variables. 
 The simple ordered logistic regression analysis between SUCCESS and CULCAP 
confirmed the association found in the correlation analysis. The regression coefficient of 
0.4705 for CULCAP was significant with a p value of 0.0258 (Table 6). The 
corresponding odds ratio was 1.601 indicating that SUCCESS would be increased 0.6 
times for every unit increase in CULCAP. 
Table 6. Simple ordered logistic regression between SUCCESS and CULCAP 
(N=34) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Independent variable        Maximum  Probability Odds ratio      POA 
             Likelihood estimates pr > ChiSq  estimates  pr > ChiSq 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CULCAP   0.4705*  0.0258    1.601  0.0894 
 
-2 Log L 63.607 
________________________________________________________________________ 
** Significant at p< 0.01 
  * Significant at p< 0.05 
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In the multiple ordered logistic regression for the full model (Table 5), the 
variable CULCAP showed a significant B value of 0.6120 with a p value of 0.0377. The 
odds ratio was 1.844 indicating that a unit increase in CULCAP resulted in approximately 
two-unit increase in SUCCESS. In this multiple correlation THAT included all the 
independent variables, the effect of CULCAP in the response variable SUCCESS was 
increased in comparison to the simple regression. 
When these two models (simple ordered logistic regression and multiple ordered 
logistic regression) were compared, the trend for the values of CULCAP such as 
regression coefficients, p values, and odds ratio were similar to those observed for 
SOCCAP. The B coefficient value was higher in the multiple model rather than in the 
simple model; the odds ratio also improved and approached 2. The -2 Log likelihood 
value also improved from 63.607 to 35.290 from the simplest to the more complex 
model. 
Empirical evidence from records and on-site interviews also supported the 
positive effect of the quality of women’s participation and leadership on the success of 
the saving box group. Women participation in the saving box groups varied from low to 
entirely women. In mixed groups a lower proportion of 10% or less of women was found 
in 6% of the groups; between 11% and 20% of women in 18% of the groups; between 
21% and 50% of women 27% of the groups; and between 51% and 80% of women in 
21% of the groups (Table 7). 
However, the quality of women participation was more important than the 
quantity of women participation. Women played representative roles in 13 mixed groups 
(38% of the total). Women performed leadership roles in both representation and in the 
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saving box management. Five groups (15% of the total) were always represented by 
women performing the roles as president, secretary, and treasurer. However, the 
proportion of groups in which women played more than four leadership positions was 20 
% (7 groups) (Table 8). In the other groups, women performed leadership roles mainly as 
secretary, treasurer, or in management of collective projects. It is important to highlight 
that in four out of nine successful saving box groups (12% of the total, and 44% of the 
successful groups), women played key leadership roles in the mixed groups. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Women’s participation in saving box groups 
______________________________________________ 
Proportion of women        Groups No. % 
Participating (%) 
______________________________________________ 
 
0   5  14.7 
 
1 – 10   2    6.0 
 
11 – 20  6  17.6 
 
21 – 50  9  26.4 
 
51 – 80  7  20.6 
 
100   5  14.7 
______________________________________________ 
 
TOTAL           34           100.0 
______________________________________________ 
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Table 8. Women’s participation in leadership roles in saving box groups 
____________________________________________________________ 
Number of positions         Groups No.  % 
     Performed 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
0      4   12 
 
1    12   35 
 
  2      4   12 
 
  3      5   15 
 
  4      2     6 
 
 5      7   20 
_____________________________________________________________ 
TOTAL     34     100 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 When group members were asked about the advantages of being in all-women, 
all-men, or mixed groups, the opinions given were: all-women groups believe that 
women were more responsible and they were better organized, women were more aware 
of household necessities, they attended group activities more frequently, and they were 
more engaged and participated more actively in the group (Appendix A). These responses 
were in concordance with findings from Shreiner and Nagarajan (1998), which stated that 
informal lenders consider females to be creditworthy, and that women borrowed from 
informal lenders more than males did. Quinones (2000) also found that women in 
microfinance groups were more supportive of their group members, more patient, 
trustworthy and giving to their peers, and they had a deeper sense of shame. The informal 
microfinance practice of ROSCAs in China were managed only by women, because they 
had better developed social networks with one another, they were more likely to remain 
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in town year round, and because men had other finance options (Tsai, 2004). Barr and 
Kinsley (2002) argued that women had a comparative advantage in lending groups 
because behavioral rules were more important for them but this advantage was unrelated 
to their responsiveness to shame sanctions. 
 When group members were asked about the advantages of working in men’s only 
groups, men answered that they can work off-farm and get money to save, and they have 
more experience in farmer’s organizations. 
 The advantages members gave for belonging to mixed groups were that men and 
women had the same opportunity for participating, the group’s life was enriched with 
more points of view, groups had the opportunity to get funding for men and women 
projects, one family was able to get two loans, they can deal with family issues within the 
group, and women can have support from men especially in tasks that demand physical 
efforts. 
 Four groups (12%) answered that there were no advantages in belonging to any 
kind of group of a particular gender composition. Concerning the disadvantages 
perceived in belonging to each kind of group, the most common response was that there 
were no disadvantages in being women, men, or mixed groups. 
Women argued that belonging to a women’s group sometimes was a disadvantage 
because women had no cash for savings from off-farm employment or from regular 
income. Other disadvantages listed were difficulties in transportation and for completing 
paperwork for institutional support due to their household responsibilities including child 
and elderly health care within their homes. 
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 Disadvantages listed by men of belonging to men’s only groups included less time 
to meet and lack of attendance discipline. Men were more accustomed to get help from 
the government and to paternalist practices from political parties limiting their 
willingness for volunteering. Other answers included that there was more corruption 
among men and men were not as efficient as women in administering cash transactions. 
 In mixed groups the member’s list of disadvantages included that sometimes they 
had to pay double fees, savings, and repayments; and that in mixed groups men tended to 
impose their opinions. 
 Women participation in saving box groups was perceived as an important tool, 
not just for microfinance program functioning and group success, but for women 
empowerment in the household and community. However, as Mayoux (2006) stated 
women’s empowerment was not an automatic outcome of microfinance programs. 
Microfinance activities have to be an integral part of public policy, which should include 
group development and complementary services for women. Pitt et al. (2006), studying 
gender relationships within the household in Bangladesh, found an increase in women’s 
empowerment when women participated in microcredit programs, which allowed them 
more decision making power, greater access to finance and economic resources, 
expanded social networks, and more freedom and mobility for social and economic 
action. Similar results were found by Wakoko (2005) studying Ugandan rural 
households. Women participation in informal finance groups was the most important 
factor promoting women’s empowerment; however, financial empowerment did not 
necessarily lead to a transformation in gender relationships. 
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 A more diverse use of loans was also observed among women’s groups. Men 
tended to allocate more investments in productive projects linked to crop or livestock 
production; while women addressed loans for a wider range of purposes from crop and 
livestock production loans to household necessity loans like health care, schooling, 
nutrition, consumption, house improvement, and small business loans, which in general 
were less riskier  than men’s business ventures. This greater diversity of loans in 
women’s groups has also been reported by Wydick (2002) and Jennings (1989) regarding 
female entrepreneurs and the allocations of profits. 
 The results of extended networks from participation in saving box groups also 
encouraged women to participate more in the local political arena. Women gained more 
confidence in dealing with group and community problem solving, which was also 
observed among self-help groups in India by Reddy and Manak (2005). 
 
4.4 Human capital 
 
Hypothesis 3: The third hypothesis in the study was that human capital was 
positively associated to saving box success in terms of its survival status. The null 
hypothesis statement was that human capital had no relationship with the success of the 
saving box groups based on its survival status and performance. 
As shown in Table 3, the Pearson correlation coefficient between SUCCESS and 
HUMCAP was 0.46145 with a p value of 0.0060, indicating a significant direct 
relationship between both variables. This positive relationship was corroborated through 
the simple ordered logistic regression analysis when the independent variable HUMCAP 
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was regressed against the response variable SUCCESS. In this analysis (Table 8) a B 
value of 0.5254 was obtained with a p value of 0.0143 denoting a significant relationship 
between both variables. The odds ratio was 1.691 indicating that for a one unit increase in 
HUMCAP, SUCCESS would increase about 0.7 times. 
 
 
Table 9. Simple ordered logistic regression between SUCCESS and HUMCAP 
(N=34) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Independent variable        Maximum  Probability Odds ratio      POA 
             Likelihood estimates pr > ChiSq  estimates  pr > ChiSq 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
HUMCAP   0.5254* 0.0143    1.691  0.7918   
-2 Log L 61.304 
________________________________________________________________________ 
** Significant at p< 0.01 
  * Significant at p< 0.05 
 
 
However, when all the independent variables were regressed against the response 
variable in the multiple ordered logistic regression analysis, the results suggested 
HUMCAP was not significantly related to SUCCESS. In Table 5 the B coefficient for 
HUMCAP was 0.2091 with an associated p value of 0.4450. The corresponding odds 
ratio was 1.233 and was negligible indicating a 0.23 unit increase in SUCCESS for each 
unit added of HUMCAP. 
  
83
 
The empirical evidence only partially supported the hypothesis about a direct 
positive effect of human capital on the success level of the saving box groups as based on 
their survival status and performance. 
The measurement of human capital in this study referred to the average number of 
years of schooling each treasurer had in each saving box group. Another dimension of 
human capital in the saving boxes was the number of treasurers trained; and when this 
indicator was used as a variable representing human capital, the relationship with the 
dependent variable SUCCESS became stronger. However, including the number of 
treasurers trained as a variable in human capital resulted in a degree of multicollinearity 
between HUMCAP and SOCCAP, and HUMCAP and FINCAP. Although the number of 
treasurers trained within a group is regarded as an internal decision of each group, a 
breakpoint may exist in which good performance of the saving box may warrant rotating 
treasurers more often within the group. Other group members were also trained in 
management of the saving box; however, they were not actually involved in saving box 
management such as keeping records, gathering savings, issuing loans, and general cash 
management. These group members were generally the group representatives, such as 
group’s president and secretary. 
Fifty-four percent of the saving box groups that did not change their treasurer 
failed or experienced average success. Successful saving box groups were those with a 
greater number of experienced treasures and more frequent rotation of them. Only one 
successful group had only one treasurer and the success of this group was likely due to 
the managerial skills of the treasurer because all of the other members were illiterate. 
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Mismanagement by the treasurer or another representative was identified only in 
four saving box groups. These cases were related to loan self-issuing and failure to repay 
them. 
Representatives work in the groups has always been voluntary, and this was true 
for treasurers managing the saving box. Only in two groups was some symbolic and 
seasonal remuneration given to the treasurer. 
 
4.5 Financial capital 
 
Hypothesis 4 stated that financial capital was a variable that positively affected 
the saving box success and performance as measured by its survival status. 
In the correlation analysis (Table 3) the Pearson coefficient between SUCCESS 
and FINCAP was 0.52438 with a p value of 0.0015 indicating a significant positive 
relationship between both variables. 
This relationship was also significant in the simple ordered logistic regression 
analysis in which the B coefficient for FINCAP was 1.7340 with an associated p value of 
0.0034. The corresponding odds ratio was 5.664 (Table 9). 
However, in the multiple ordered logistic regression for the full model (Table 5), 
a not significant B coefficient of 1.4887 for the variable was obtained with a p value of 
0.0606. The odds ratio was 4.431, which indicated that a 4.5 unit increase in the response 
variable SUCCESS was obtained for each unit increase of FINCAP. 
When these two models were compared, the B coefficient values decreased from 
the simple to the complete model. The odd ratios showed the same decreasing pattern. 
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The -2 Log likelihood value improved from 58.498 to 35.290 from the simple to the 
multiple regression model. This improvement in the -2 Log likelihood value suggested 
that when more independent variables are involved the ability of FINCAP to predict 
SUCCESS increased. 
These results suggested the stated hypothesis about the positive effect of the 
variable financial capital on the success and survival of the saving box group was 
partially, but not fully, supported. 
 
 
Table 10. Simple ordered logistic regression between SUCCESS and FINCAP 
(N=34) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Independent variable        Maximum  Probability Odds ratio      POA 
             Likelihood estimates pr > ChiSq  estimates  pr > ChiSq 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
FINCAP   1.7340** 0.0034    5.664  0.5485 
-2 Log L 58.498 
________________________________________________________________________ 
** Significant at p< 0.01 
  * Significant at p< 0.05 
 
 
As was described in the methodology chapter, financial capital was measured by 
the household’s diverse sources of money and assets; access to financial services (formal 
or informal) and the existence of built capital of the group.  
The most mentioned income sources for group members were: farming (crops, 
vegetables, forages, fruits, and flowers), backyard and extensive livestock operations 
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(cow-calf, goats, sheep, hogs, chicken, and turkey), forestry, off-farm employment 
(mason, construction carpenter, marble industry, and farm worker), remittances, brick 
making, and small trade. 
Built capital was identified by the group’s assets or material resources for farm 
production and commercialization. This kind of collective property was identified in 50% 
of the groups and was the result of collective projects funded from governmental 
institutions. The most common built capital of groups was: farmland, irrigation systems, 
peach orchards; nurseries for peach tree production; green houses for hydroponic 
vegetable production, dairy facilities (equipment, and cows), goat pens, edible mushroom 
production facilities, bakeries, corn mills, tortilla making machines, input supply stores, 
grocery stores, feed lot facilities, hog production facilities, sewing machines, buildings 
and warehouses, and tractors, trucks and other agricultural implements. 
The positive effect of financial capital on the survival and performance of the 
saving box groups can be attributed mainly to its components, such as the diversity of 
income sources which enable group members to access money for financial services. In 
addition, the presence of common ownership on material assets works as a cohesive 
means for keeping group members united around group projects. 
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CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 
The major objective of the present study was examining the relationships between 
a microfinance community scheme called saving box and socioeconomic factors affecting 
the performance and sustainability of these specialized community groups. The 
sustainability of the saving box groups was assessed in terms of their survival status and 
performance as informal microfinance institutions. In a preliminary study, socioeconomic 
factors were identified as independent variables associated with the survival and success 
level of these small farmer saving box schemes. The research question that guided this 
study was stated as: which factors were related to the success or failure of rural 
community microfinance schemes called saving boxes? And more specifically, how well 
do human, social, cultural and financial capitals, indicate survival and sustainability of 
these savings and loan groups? It is hoped that the results from this study will improve 
the understanding of the role and impact of socioeconomic factors in the success of 
saving boxes in small rural communities in the Central Valleys of the State of Puebla, 
Mexico. This knowledge will enable researchers and microfinance practitioners to better 
understand how rural microfinance systems are working “on the ground”, and how they 
can be addressed to strengthen rural development programs in small rural communities. 
The microfinance community scheme called saving box is an informal 
microfinance institution like self-help groups, Grameen Bank joint liability groups, 
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ROSCAs or ASCRAs. However, the saving box has specific microfinance services 
including savings and loans, self-management and self-regulation, loans funded by 
savings and seed capital from an external agent, individual liability, compulsory savings 
not associated with banks, and no NGO participation. This kind of informal microfinance 
institution (IFI) plays an important role in providing savings, loans and self-insurance 
services to small rural communities, where the formal banking coverage is negligible or 
simply non-existent. 
Four hypotheses were in the research study. The first hypothesis related to the 
residing social capital in the small farmers’ groups and its positive effect on the survival 
and performance of the saving box. This hypothesis was confirmed after statistical 
evidence identified a causal and positive relationship between these two variables. The 
Pearson correlation coefficient and the regression coefficients in the simple and multiple 
ordered logistic regressions were significant. A significant Odds Ratio value of 14.69 was 
obtained, which meant that the likelihood for success in the saving box increased almost 
15 times for each unit of social capital. 
Social capital appeared to be the most influential factor on determining the 
survival and performance level of the microfinance community scheme called saving 
box. Social capital was measured in terms of trust, reciprocity, norms and rules, groups 
and networks, meeting frequency, and participation in community decision making. Most 
of the groups showed strong social capital inventories. However, the successful groups 
showed higher indices of trust, networking and meeting frequency. 
The presence of collective projects among group members was observed as a 
cohesive means to keep the group united. A successful saving box was a key factor in 
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maintaining an active membership within the group promoting an iterative process or 
“virtuous circle”. In this sense, individual and family interests were compatible with 
those of the group in which the main reason for participation was to benefit from 
improved access to savings and loans for all kinds of daily necessities. 
The positive impact of seed capital provided to the groups for their initial 
establishment of a saving and loan operation was viewed as critical in this study. The 
period of maturation for each group differed and therefore the time they can successfully 
manage such external funds should vary. Groups that failed and those with middle levels 
of survival and performance resulted from organizational weakness after repaying the 
seed capital. This organizational weakness was attributed to weak or non-existent training 
and follow up. The reason why the successful groups satisfactorily overcame these same 
limitations offered insights to successful microfinance schemes. In many cases of failed 
or weaker saving box groups members stopped saving and divided and distributed the 
seed capital and social fund generated from the interest among group members. In other 
cases saving box funds were used to cover defaulted loans in order to not affect 
members’ savings and benefits. The restarting process under these conditions was more 
difficult, because they had to restart with no outside sources of seed capital funds for 
lending. This situation mirrored their initial status in which the seed capital played a key 
role in fueling initial savings and lending operations. 
Findings of the present study on the effect of social capital in microfinance group 
performance were consistent with those reported in the literature. Self-selection, self-
monitoring and self-enforcement of contracts involved in group decision making during 
meetings were key ingredients for successful microfinance practices. Also synergistic 
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effects were promoted by effective internal communication flow, connections with 
institutional providers of training, technical support, and external resources for funding 
collective projects. In contrast, kinship ties and family subgroups tended to monopolize 
saving box benefits and exerted negative effects in micro lending practices primarily 
because of self-lending, bigger loans, arrears and defaulting. 
The second hypothesis was related to the positive effect of women participating in 
leadership roles on the survival and performance of the saving box. This hypothesis was 
confirmed after analyzing the statistical evidence provided from the correlation and the 
simple and multiple ordered logistic regressions. The Pearson correlation and the 
regression coefficients were significant and revealed a causal relationship between the 
two variables. The OR value associated with the multiple logistic regression was 1.844, 
which indicated that success of the saving box increased almost two times for every unit 
increase in women’s leadership participation. 
Cultural capital was the second most influential factor in determining saving box 
survival and performance. Assessing the degree and impact of women participation in 
leadership and management roles in the microfinance scheme proved to be an important 
factor for saving boxes success. This finding was entirely compatible with those reported 
in the literature, which are concordant with the opinions from those group members 
interviewed in this study. 
Women were considered creditworthy, to have better management and 
organizational skills; more honest, disciplined and more cognizant of individual and 
group needs. These skills were quite likely related to their role at the household level, 
where they focused more on individual and family needs. On the other hand, women as 
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individuals or within a group have traditionally been tied less to governmental and 
private institutions. Therefore, they may have been less exposed to bureaucratic policies, 
political influence, and corrupt practices, which may have been more influential among 
men and men groups in the agricultural and rural development areas in Mexico. 
About 44% (four out of nine) of the successful groups were women’s or mixed 
groups in which women played key roles in representing and managing group activities. 
Out of seven groups that failed only one was a all-women’s group (14%), while four all-
men’s groups failed (57%), and two mix groups failed (29%). Even men recognized 
women’s abilities in saving box management when the men came from failed men’s 
groups and joined women groups in the same community. 
The third hypothesis was that human capital was positively associated with the 
success level of saving boxes based on survival and performance status. The statistical 
evidence from the correlation and regression analyses did not completely confirm this 
hypothesis.  Although the Pearson correlation and simple logistic regression coefficients 
were significant, the regression coefficient for human capital in the multiple ordered 
logistic regression involving all the variables was not significant. 
Human capital in this study was measured as the average years of schooling of the 
treasurer in each group. This indicator may not have been the best way to assess this 
variable as a group feature, since a treasurer’s schooling is more of an individual attribute 
than a group characteristic. The treasurer’s formal education fluctuated widely among 
groups, and because this position is usually voluntary, the treasurer was not always the 
most educated member of the group. Under these circumstances, the schooling average of 
the entire group might have more accurately reflected human capital. 
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As many scholars have noted, education is commonly a scarce resource among 
the poor. NGOs, universities and governmental extension services can provide training 
and technical advice in bookkeeping and accounting, organizational structure and 
leadership development. In this case only technicians from the promoting institution, 
Colegio de Postgraduados, provided these services, which ceased in 2003. After that year, 
the surviving saving box groups operated by their own means with practically no external 
institutional support. 
The fourth and last hypothesis stated that financial capital positively affected the 
saving box success and performance based on survival and performance status. The 
correlation and simple logistic regression coefficients indicated a significant association 
between the two variables; however, the multiple ordered logistic regression coefficient 
for financial capital was not significant. The odds ratio was large enough (almost 6 times) 
to suggest some relationship between financial capital and the success of a saving box 
even though not quite statistically significant. 
Financial capital was measured using the diversity of income sources of the 
member’s households and the collective ownership of built capital by saving box groups. 
However, as in the case of human capital, financial capital was assessed as an aggregate 
at the group level. It may be necessary to explore financial capital at the micro-level of a 
household in order to better assess the impact of financial capital on saving box success. 
In summary, socioeconomic factors were significantly related to saving box 
survival and performance status and social capital and cultural capital were especially 
influential. Financial capital and human capital may have some effect but indicators or 
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proxies for these capitals need to be accurately identified and defined for future research 
at individual and household levels. 
 
5.2 Policy implications 
 
The barriers affecting microfinance institutions in general, and informal 
microfinance institutions in particular, such as small size and resources, lack of trained 
staff, inappropriate organizational structure, insufficient institutional support including 
technical assistance, training and funding, represent formidable challenges for national 
governments and private institutions involved in the microfinance industry. Microfinance 
represents a needed alternative to typical commercial finance markets, which are not 
serving an important sector of the population, the poor. Alternative microfinance schemes 
like saving boxes that serve local needs are similar to the farmers’ markets movement in 
the United States, which support local and more diverse individual needs of small farmers 
than the industrial, consolidated economic model. Locally focused, microfinance schemes 
have the potential for achieving important advancements in revitalizing local economies, 
improving access to healthy food, and promoting environmental and social issues that 
address sustainable development. 
Comprehensive public policies are needed to deal with the promotion and support 
of formal microfinance institutions for the poor. Informal microfinance institutions (IFI) 
are especially important and worthy of more institutional support with policies addressed 
to empower the poor, especially women. These IFIs not only need an adequate and 
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suitable legal framework in order to act under legal jurisdiction, but also to have access to 
training, technical support, funding and prudential supervision. 
The Law of Popular Savings and Credit passed in June 2002 by the Mexican 
Congress and published by the Executive Branch, unfortunately did not directly address 
IFIs. The main precepts contained in this law like equity capital, savings mobilization 
conditions, interest rates regulation, and prudential supervision, among others, were 
addressed more specifically to formal microfinance institutions (MFIs) like savings and 
credit coops, popular banks, micro-banks, and other bank-like institutions. This law and 
its legal framework did not fill the IFIs’ particular needs for their actual conditions and 
specific operational procedures. 
Despite the informal character of the IFIs, there are several lessons to be learned 
from them with important implications for improving microfinance programs in 
developing countries. Small farmer organizations working in microfinance have shown to 
be persistent over time because they represent a real alternative for coping with their 
financial needs, which are not covered by the formal financial market. 
 
5.3 Recommendations 
 
Institutional support from governments and private institutions like NGOs need to 
address organizational support structures in microfinance programs. These efforts should 
focus on improving quality in microfinance services, such as training staff, providing 
technical advice, and improving access to funding, improving saving and lending 
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practices, and for investing in physical facilities (buildings, furniture, communication 
equipment, computer tools and software, etc.). 
Legal arrangements need to be added in the regulatory system in order to assist 
those evolving informal microfinance institutions that want and are able to advance to a 
more formal microfinance organization. Since informal microfinance practices are a 
pervasive practice among the poor, networks assisted by research scholars and 
practitioners are needed to continue generating knowledge from empirical experiences 
working within these microfinance groups. 
Some of the limitations observed in this study resulted from the focus on groups 
as the unit of analysis. This approach allowed a more complete understanding of the 
group performance affected by socioeconomic factors such as social, cultural, human and 
financial capitals. However, such factors exert and are influenced by effects at the 
individual and at household levels which were not the foci of this research. Thus, a study 
or series of studies focusing on individuals and households participating and not 
participating in the microfinance community schemes are needed to disclose other factors 
affecting the success or failure of microfinance practices. 
Studies at the micro-level, focusing on individuals and households would enable a 
better measurement of human and financial capitals using more suitable proxies for their 
assessment. These studies would strengthen the ability to explore other important 
indicators or factors affecting saving box success, such as leadership, entrepreneurship, 
loan fate, repayment rates, arrears, defaulting, etc. 
Based on the results of this study, social and cultural capitals are strong positive 
influences on success of informal microfinance groups. Building these capitals within 
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informal rural community finance groups should be an integral part of policy strategies to 
improve financial services to the poor. Saving boxes not only provide an important local 
strategy to serve financial needs, but can and should be structured to provide 
opportunities for leadership and empowerment of the rural poor, especially of women. 
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APPENDIX  A 
 
INFORMATION FROM SECONDARY SOURCES AND FROM OPINIONS OF 
THE INTERVIEWEE 
 
Table 1A. Legal status of saving box groups 
Type of association    No. Groups   % 
 
Social Solidarity Society         27    79 
 
Society of Rural Production           2      6 
 
None              5    15 
 
    TOTAL       34    100 
Source: Group records 
 
 
Table 2A. Type of land tenure among saving box group communities 
 
Type of land tenure    No. Groups   % 
 
Ejido             11    32 
 
Small-property            5    15 
 
Ejido and Small-property          18    53 
 
    TOTAL        34    100 
Source: Group records 
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Table 3A. Age of the groups with saving box 
 
Years    No. Groups    % 
 
10-11           8     23 
 
12-15          23     68 
 
16-17            2       6 
 
22            1       3 
 
  TOTAL      34     100 
Source: Group records 
 
 
 
 
Table 4A. Institutional actors in the origin of the groups 
 
Institution    No. Groups    % 
 
Colegio de Postgraduados         28     82 
 
Enlace y Comunicacion AC          4     12 
 
Rural Development Secretary          1       3 
 
National Union of Agricultural Workers    1       3 
 
   TOTAL       34     100 
Source: Group records 
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Table 5A. Opinions on reasons for trust among group members 
Reason      Group No.  % 
 
Relatives, neighbors, and friends   14   41 
 
They know each other       2     6 
 
Use to work together/united      9   26 
 
Working well        2     6 
 
Still managing collective projects     1     3 
 
No response        6   18 
 
   TOTAL   34   100 
Source: Interview 
 
 
Table 6A. Opinions on reasons for trust between group members and their leaders 
Reason      Group No.  % 
 
Good job as representatives    19   56 
 
Good information flow      2     6 
 
Poor performance in leadership     6   17 
 
Internal division       3     9 
 
Repayment problems       2     6 
 
No response        2     6 
 
   TOTAL   34   100 
Source: Interview 
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Table 7A. Opinions on reasons for trust between group members and their local 
authorities 
Reason      Group No.  % 
 
Good communication     12   35 
 
No contact or scarce communication    12   35 
 
Sometimes some communication     6   18 
 
Local authority is a relative      3     9 
 
Local authority is a group member     1     3 
 
   TOTAL   34   100 
Source: Interview 
 
 
 
Table 8A. Reciprocity practices among groups 
Reason     Group No.   % 
 
“Faenas”      19   56 
 
“Faenas” and money donations     8   23 
 
None         7   21 
 
   TOTAL   34   100 
Source: Interview 
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Table 9A. Advantages in being a women/men/mixed group 
Opinion     Group No.  % 
 
Women 
Responsible and better organized       3     9 
Aware of household necessities       2     6 
Attend more frequently        1     3 
More engaged and participate actively      1     3 
 
Men 
Get money easily to save        7   20 
Experience in organization        1     3 
 
Mix 
More points of view         3     9 
Projects for women and men        3     9 
Same opportunity for participating       6   17 
Attend family issues         1     3 
Support from men         1     3 
Ability to get two loans        1     3 
 
No advantages          4   12 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   TOTAL     34   100 
Source: Interview 
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Table 10A. Disadvantages in being a women/men/mixed group 
Opinion      Group No.  % 
 
Women 
Sometimes no money for saving        1     3 
More difficult to mobilize and do paperwork       1     3 
 
Men 
Accustomed to get help from government       1     3 
Lack of discipline          2     3 
More corruption          1     3 
No as efficient as women in administering money      1     3 
Paternalism           2     6 
Less time to meet          2     6 
 
Mix 
Double fees, savings, and payments        4   12 
Men tend to impose opinions         2     6 
 
No disadvantages        15   44 
 
No response           2     6 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   TOTAL      34   100 
Source: Interview 
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APPENDIX  B 
 
PROTOCOL FOR INTERVIEWING KEY INFORMANTS OF SAVING BOXES 
IN THE CENTRAL VALLEYS OF PUEBLA 
 
Social capital 
1. When the group was created? At the same time as the saving box? 
2. What was the original objective of the group? 
3. Who (which actors) participated in the creation of the group? 
4. What kind of land tenure do the group members have? 
5. To what extent do you trust your group mates? 
VERY HIGH  HIGH  REGULAR  LOW  VERY LOW 
6. Please give us an example which illustrates your trust in your group mates 
______________________________________________________________ 
7. To what extent do you trust in your group representatives? 
VERY HIGH  HIGH  REGULAR  LOW  VERY LOW 
8. Please give us an example which illustrates your trust in your group representatives 
______________________________________________________________ 
9. To what extent do you trust in your local authorities? 
VERY HIGH  HIGH  REGULAR  LOW  VERY LOW 
10. Please give us an example which illustrates your trust in your local authorities 
______________________________________________________________ 
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11. Does your group have some practices of self-help and reciprocity, and interchange in 
kind, labor or time?  
12. Please list these practices of self-help and reciprocity, and interchange 
_________________________________________________________________ 
13. How intensive are these practices of self-help and reciprocity, and interchange in your 
group and community? 
VERY HIGH  HIGH  REGULAR  LOW  VERY LOW 
14. Does your group have rules, norms and sanctions written or unwritten to help the 
group’s functioning? 
15. To which extent are these rules, norms and sanctions observed by the group’s 
members? 
VERY HIGH  HIGH  REGULAR  LOW  VERY LOW 
16. Can you provide some examples about rules observation? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
17. In which community groups or organizations does your group participate? 
18. Which of these groups are in hierarchical (vertical) relationship? 
19. How intense is your participation in these groups in terms of your group attendance to 
the organizations’ activities? 
VERY HIGH  HIGH  REGULAR  LOW  VERY LOW 
20. Can you provide some examples about the community groups’ participation? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
21. In which regional or external organizations does your group participate? 
22. Which of them are hierarchical or vertically related? 
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23. How intense is your group participation in these organizations in terms of attendance 
to the organizations’ activities? 
VERY HIGH  HIGH  REGULAR  LOW  VERY LOW 
24. What are some examples of your group’s participation in regional or external 
organizations’? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
25. Does your group have relationships with private (NGO’s) and/or public 
(governmental) institutions? Which ones? 
26. How intense is your group’s participation with these institutions in terms of 
programs, projects, and activities? 
VERY HIGH  HIGH  REGULAR  LOW  VERY LOW 
27. Can you provide some examples about your group’s participation with NGO’s and 
governmental institutions? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
28. What do you think of the saving box mission? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Cultural capital 
29. What are the advantages of being in a female/male/mixed saving box group? 
30. Are there any disadvantages of being in a female/male/mixed saving box group? 
31. In mixed groups were or are there women in charge as your group representative? 
32. Is there a formal system for community/volunteer work in your community and 
group? 
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Current situation of the saving box 
33. Are the group’s members currently saving? 
34. Are they currently paying interest? 
35. Are they repaying loans? 
36. Is the saving box issuing loans? 
37. Are the representatives keeping records? 
38. Is the group meeting on a regular basis? 
39. How does your saving box keep records? 
40. How can group members be sure that those records are correct? 
41. Which have been the most important events in the saving box life cycle? 
42. How have you interacted as a group before these events? 
43. What impacts or consequences have these events and interactions had in your group? 
44. Can you identify these key stages in your group? 
a) Seed capital provision b) Technical advice c) No technical advice 
45. In general, how do you explain the saving box’s current situation? 
46. If the saving box is not working, when did it stop and why?  
 
Financial capital 
47. Ranked by importance, what are the sources of money in your group’s households? 
Built capital 
48. Does your group have material resources such as buildings, warehouses, machinery, 
equipment, vehicles, etc. Please list them 
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Human capital 
49. Has some member in the saving box group been benefited with new knowledge and 
skills acquired by training or technical advice to manage the saving box? How many? 
50. How many people have served as treasurer of your saving box? 
51. How often does the saving box rotate or change Treasurers? 
52. Has fraud or mismanagement occurred in the saving box? If yes, what do you think 
was the main reason? 
53. Does the Treasurer receive economic compensation or preferential treatment in 
retribution to his/her job? 
 
Political capital 
54. Does the group participate with or in political parties? 
55. Does the group participate with or in the local government? 
56. Does the group participate in political decision making at local level? 
57. To which extent has your group and representatives influenced political decision 
making at the local level? 
VERY HIGH  HIGH  REGULAR  LOW  VERY LOW 
58. Can you provide some examples about your group’s and members’ influence in 
political decision making at the local level? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
59. How strong is your group’s negotiation power with public and private institutions? 
60. How are the group’s representatives elected? 
61. Are there opinion leaders who are not formal leaders of the group? 
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Vulnerability context 
62. What are the main shocks faced by the group members in the community (floods, 
droughts, cyclones, deaths in the family, violence), seasonality (crop production, job 
market), and trends and changes (population, environmental change, technology, markets 
and trade, and globalization) during the last five years? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
     Interviewer________________________________ 
     Date _______/_______________/______________ 
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